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In this Article Professor Tomkovicz examines the distinctive nature
of the Massiah sixth amendment-based right to counsel and the charac-
ter of the exclusionary "remedies" that must follow from Massiah viola-
tions. Arguing that the basic value protected by Massiah's right to
counsel in pretrial encounters is that of helping to ensure criminal de-
fendants are able to engage with the state on roughly equal footing at
trial, the author concludes it is essential to exclude the use at trial of
evidence obtained in violation of Massiah in order to protect the consti-
tutional right of adversarial fair play. Professor Tomkovicz proceeds to
evaluate the appropriateness of applying fourth amendment and Mi-
randa-based exceptions to exclusion which are grounded hot in a consti-
tutional right to exclusion, but rather in a rule-based exclusion
regulation designed to deter future violations, to the Massiah sixth
amendment-based setting. By virtue of the different rationales and na-
tures of the violations, the author concludes that only a selective few of
the fourth amendment and Miranda-based exclusionary exceptions are
proper in Massiah situations and that blind application of other exclu-
sionary rule exceptions created for use outside the Massiah setting is
both inappropriate and harmful to the Massiah sixth amendment-based
right to counsel.
I. INTRODUCTION
The study of constitutional criminal procedure involves the examination of
two interrelated topics: the substantive constitutional rights we afford criminal
suspects and defendants and the exclusionary consequences that flow from viola-
tions of those rights. Exclusionary "remedies" are a final, critical chapter in any
complete evaluation of constitutional liberties. The advisability of excluding
particular evidence and the validity of specific restrictions upon suppression1
should ordinarily depend upon the underlying rationales for exclusion.2 Those
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1. The words "exclusion" and "suppression" are used synonymously throughout this Article.
Both refer to the refusal to allow items to be admitted into evidence in the courtroom.
2. The Supreme Court has acknowledged the logic and importance of tying exclusionary rule
doctrine to the rationales for exclusion. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974)
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rationales, in turn, must be rooted in the substance of the various constitutional
guarantees that govern our criminal processes. 3 Consequently, understanding
the content of the rights is a prerequisite to reasoned analysis of exclusionary
principles.
Most of the United States Supreme Court's exclusionary rule work has been
in the fourth amendment area.4 Some decisions have involved Miranda's fifth
amendment-based safeguards.5 Only one significant exclusionary rule opinion
has been predicated on transgression of the sixth amendment right to counsel
provision.6 Consequently, the Court has said relatively little about the premises
and limits of sixth amendment exclusion. What it has said has been ambiguous
or not well grounded in the right to counsel.7 More important, the Court has
not told us whether the several significant limitations in the fourth and fifth
amendment exclusionary rule cases are transferable to the sixth amendment
context.
The Massiah doctrine's sixth amendment right to counsel against open or
surreptitious elicitation of incriminating information by state agents has proven
remarkably durable for a quarter of a century.8 It would seem to be only a
matter of time until the exclusionary issues that have arisen in fourth and fifth
amendment cases reach the Court in sixth amendment Massiah contexts. Reso-
lution of those issues will demand a clear understanding of the character of the
sixth amendment entitlement reflected in the Massiah doctrine and identification
of the basic rationales for suppressing evidence acquired in disregard of that
entitlement. 9 The first goal of this Article is to sketch the nature of the sixth
amendment right and to derive from that nature the legitimate justifications for
sixth amendment exclusion. 10 In light of those justifications, the Article will
("As with any remedial device, the application of the [exclusionary) rule has been restricted to those
areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served.").
3. Cf Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 456 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring) (observing that the
answer to an exclusionary rule issue before the Court "follow[ed] readily" from the proper identifica-
tion of the constitutional wrong involved).
4. See, e.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98
(1980); United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
5. See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975);
Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
6. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984). Another sixth amendment opinion should be
forthcoming before long. See Michigan v. Harvey, 109 S. Ct. 1117 (1989) (granting certiorari in case
involving impeachment use of statement taken in violation of sixth amendment doctrine).
7. See Williams, 467 U.S. at 456 (Stevens, J., concurring) (suggesting that the majority's exclu-
sionary rule generalizations were not responsive to the primary sixth amendment issue in the case);
MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, § 449 (E. Cleary 3d ed. 1984) (accusing the Court of not considering or
discussing the decisions to extend exclusionary sanctions to fifth and sixth amendment contexts).
8. See Tomkovicz, An Adversary System Defense of the Right to Counsel Against Informants:
Truth, Fair Play, and the Massiah Doctrine, 22 U.C. DAVis L. REV. 1, 4-6 (1988).
9. See Wasserstrom & Mertens, The Exclusionary Rule on the Scaffold: But Was It a Fair
Trial? 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 85, 177-78 & n.515 (1984) (suggesting that the Court's treatment of
Massiah exclusion as identical in nature and purpose to fourth amendment exclusion has made the
sixth amendment right, and the evidentiary exclusion that flows from failure to honor the Massiah
entitlement, "vulnerable to lines of attack that it previously could have withstood.").
10. See infra text accompanying notes 16-120.
[Vol. 67
MASSIAH RIGHT TO EXCLUSION
discuss standing to claim sixth amendment exclusion.1 I It will then consider the
fate of evidence derived from sixth amendment violations and the propriety of
"independent source," "inevitable discovery," ".attenuation," and "good faith"
exceptions to sixth amendment exclusion. 12 Finally, the Article will address the
use of products derived from Massiah violations to impeach defendants, 13 and
the availability of sixth amendment-based exclusion in collateral proceedings.' 4
The primary objective of this Article is to provide a theoretical foundation
for Massiah exclusion.15 Based on that foundation, the discussion will propose
answers to several sixth amendment exclusionary issues that are likely to arise.
With the constitutional roots and pragmatic anchors proffered here, the Massiah
right should be better equipped to withstand the assaults of its opponents and
fulfill its important functions in our criminal justice system.
II. THE NATURE AND DEFINITION OF THE MASSIAH RIGHT
Evaluation of the foundations and reach of the sixth amendment exclusion-
ary rule requires an understanding of the character of the Massiah right to coun-
sel.' 6 The sixth amendment right to counsel is the central element of our
adversary system. That system contemplates a contest between opposing sides.
By nature, one of those sides is significantly more powerful in most, if not all,
relevant respects. The grant of counsel to the inherently inferior defendant is
designed to promote balanced contests by equalizing the adversaries. Counsel
brings legal expertise, knowledge of the system, tactical and strategic savvy, and
a commitment to the defense of the accused against state efforts to impose a
criminal penalty.
"Rough equality"' 7 between the opponents is desirable and necessary not
only to promote accurate and truthful results, but also to ensure that those re-
sults are the products of adversarial fair play. By guaranteeing an equalizer for
the accused, we grant a fair opportunity to contest the state's accusation and
11. See infra text accompanying notes 130-36.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 137-96.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 197-213.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 214-24.
15. Just as the Massiah right to counsel has been attacked as lacking constitutionally legitimate
premises, see Tomkovicz, supra note 8, at 25-30, the exclusion of evidence obtained in violation of
Massiah's pretrial extension of the sixth amendment has been accused of having "no valid justifica-
tion." See United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 296-98 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
16. The Massiah right to counsel and the doctrine defining that right's purview have been de-
veloped in a series of significant Supreme Court decisions in the past ten years. See Kuhlmann v.
Wilson, 477 U.S. 436 (1986); Michigan v. Jackson, 475 U.S. 625 (1986); Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S.
412 (1986); Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159 (1985); United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980);
Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977).
This Article's textual discussion of the character of the Massiah right is based on a much
lengthier and more detailed treatment in a previous article. Most specific points in the instant dis-
cussion will not be supported by citations to that piece. The reader who desires fuller, supported
explanation of the observations and conclusions in this section should see Tomkovicz, supra note 8,
at 9-22.
17. No one claims that the equalization accomplished by the sixth amendment is "exact" or
"perfect." We are content with "rough equality," with eliminating inherent gross disparities be-
tween sides. See Tomkovicz, supra note 8, at 40.
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prosecution. Our societal commitment to limited governmental power over indi-
vidual lives and our reluctance to exploit or take advantage of the weak and
inferior are made manifest by the promise of counsel's assistance. Counsel is one
means through which we practice and proclaim our system's respect for individ-
ual worth, dignity, and autonomy.
Originally, the right to counsel extended to trials alone. However, Ameri-
can criminal processes gradually developed pretrial adversarial stages. If ac-
cused individuals were left unassisted, thus unequal in these pretrial encounters,
the values promoted by the sixth amendment trial right could have been all too
easily undermined. To prevent governmental circumvention of the constitu-
tional ideal of balanced contests, the right to counsel was-as it had to be-
extended to pretrial "critical stages"18 of the prosecution.' 9
One stage that qualifies as critical is a "conversational encounter" between
a defendant and a known or undercover government agent who elicits inculpa-
tory disclosures.20 The equalization of adversaries through the promise of coun-
sel for the defendant includes a guarantee that the state will neither openly nor
secretly deal with the accused unless he has the full benefit of counsel's skills,
knowledge, and advice. Both above-board and surreptitious approaches to se-
cure pretrial admissions of culpability can deprive the defendant of important
input from his champion concerning the critical decision to discuss an accusa-
tion with the state. That input, which is clearly a part of the entitlement to trial
counsel, 21 would be of little value at trial if the government could evade its pro-
tective effects by confronting an accused with uncounseled pretrial choices. For
that reason, an accused is entitled to counsel during certain pretrial encounters
in which the state may acquire revelations of guilt.
The evolved Massiah doctrine delineates the encounters that trigger an enti-
tlement to counsel.2 2 Current standards require a formal, official initiation of
adversary criminal proceedings. Once that threshold is crossed, the defendant is
entitled to counsel if the state "deliberately elicits" incriminating disclosures.
Deliberate elicitation includes direct, face-to-face encounters with known police
officers as well as surreptitious approaches by unknown government infor-
mants23 and requires "active" elicitation of disclosures. Although mere conver-
18. "Critical stages" is the Court's description of those pretrial events at which an accused
needs, and is entitled to, the sixth amendment right to counsel. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412,
429 (1986); Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 170 (1985); United States v. Ash, 413 U.S. 300, 310-11
(1973).
19. As is noted below, a "formal prosecution"-an actual initiation of adversary judicial crimi-
nal proceedings-is an essential prerequisite for attachment of the sixth amendment right. There
can be no "critical stage" without a "prosecution." See Burbine, 475 U.S. at 432.
20. I use the description "conversational encounter" as a generalization for the stage designated
as critical by the Massiah doctrine.
21. In my previous discussion of the Massiah right, I concluded that the state's pretrial dealings
with an accused should be governed by the sixth amendment if the same dealings at trial would
demand counsel. I found the Massiah extension of counsel to pretrial encounters designed to secure
admissions both logical and necessary because the government could not conduct similar uncoun-
seled trial dealings with a defendant-adversary. See Tomkovicz, supra note 8, at 56-60.
22. See generally Tomkovicz, supra note 8, at 12-22, for a specific and detailed discussion of
Massiah doctrine.
23. The government cannot be held responsible for deliberate elicitations by its informant un-
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sation is enough, passive listening to inculpatory revelations will not suffice to
trigger sixth amendment protection. 24
The basic nature of the Massiah right is relatively clear. Massiah defines a
necessary pretrial extension of the original sixth amendment promise of equali-
zation in the adversarial trial contest with the state. That promise is intended to
promote truthful outcomes reached by means that accord with our notions of
fair and decent treatment and respect for every individual. The object of trial
counsel is to prevent convictions arrived at through imbalanced, and therefore
unfair, battles. The object of pretrial counsel is identical. This object, and the
general nature of the Massiah right, must be the wellspring of the rationales,
principles, and particulars of sixth amendment exclusion.
III. PREMISES OF EXCLUSION: FOURTH, FIFTH, AND SIXTH AMENDMENT
DIFFERENCES AND SIMILARITIES
The main objective of this section is to identify the reasons for excluding
evidence derived from Massiah violations. An initial exploration of fourth and
fifth amendment exclusionary reasoning will provide a helpful preface. Thereaf-
ter, this section will describe the Supreme Court's apparent views concerning
sixth amendment exclusion and will identify potential rationales for Massiah ex-
clusion. Finally, this section will provide a constitutional rationalization of such
exclusion.
A. Fourth and Fifth Amendment Rationales
Constitutional evidentiary exclusion originated in a 1914 fourth amend-
ment decision, Weeks v. United States.25 In Weeks, despite the lack of a textual
basis for exclusion,26 a unanimous Court prohibited the use at trial of evidence
less the circumstances show that its "formal" employees knew that the undercover agent was likely
to induce disclosures. See United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 270 (1980). A somewhat objective
standard is used to assess the state's knowledge. The question is whether the state "'must have
known'" that its informant was likely to elicit. See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 176 n.12 (1985)
(quoting United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 271 (1980)). For a discussion of the meaning of that
standard, see Tomkovicz, supra note 8, at 16-20.
24. The specific requirements of the current Massiah doctrine ought to be modified in several
respects to reflect better the meaning and objectives of the sixth amendment. More specifically,
either arrest or the initiation of proceedings ought to mark the threshold of the pretrial sixth amend-
ment right. See Tomkovicz, supra note 8, at 63-71. Furthermore, in undercover contexts abolition
of the requirement that the regular state agents "know" of the likelihood of elicitation by their
informant is in order. The relevant inquiry is simply whether the informant was a state "agent." See
Tomkovicz, supra note 8, at 71-77. Finally, "active" elicitation by the state agent in contact with the
defendant should not be necessary. In many situations, particularly those involving unknown
agents, surreptitious, passive reception of revelations should come within sixth amendment control.
See Tomkovicz, supra note 8, at 77-83.
25. 232 U.S. 383 (1914). Until the explosive growth of constitutional criminal procedure doc-
trines in the 1960s and the consequent constraints upon law enforcement practices, the fourth
amendment was one of only two sources of constitutionally based exclusion. The other did not
appear until 1936 in Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936). There, the Court held that the due
process clause bars states from using coerced confessions at criminal trials.
26. The fourth amendment language makes no mention of the consequences of "unreasonable"
searches or seizures. It simply commands the government not to violate the people's right to be
secure against such practices. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
1989]
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secured in violation of fourth amendment commands.2 7 The basis of this origi-
nal exclusionary rule is a bit obscure. Several statements in Weeks, however,
read in light of the total absence of references to the goal of deterring improper
police conduct, and the ultimate conclusion that the defendant had suffered "a
denial of ... constitutional rights,"'28 strongly suggest that the Weeks Court
meant to endorse a fourth amendment right to suppression.
In 1961 a sharply divided Court issued its most controversial exclusionary
rule opinion, Mapp v. Ohio.2 9 The Court appeared to posit two primary ratio-
nales for its holding that the fourteenth amendment due process clause mandates
state exclusion to the same extent that the fourth amendment commandsfederal
exclusion. 30 Several times, the majority opinion cast exclusion as a defendant's
right.3 1 In addition, the Court observed more than once that exclusion func-
tioned as a necessary deterrent sanction, preventing future deprivations of con-
stitutional privacy interests. 32 Toward the end of the opinion, yet a third reason
for suppression appeared: the preservation of judicial integrity. 33
In the late 1960s and early 1970s the Court began a determined assault on
and reorientation of the Mapp Court's exclusionary rule premises. The Court
focused on deterrence as the primary justification and flatly rejected the notion
27. To be more precise, the Court concluded that such evidence should be returned to a defend-
ant who has requested its return. However, the unavoidable effect of restoring improperly secured
evidence to a defendant is the exclusion of that evidence from the prosecution's case. Moreover, the
Court stated that "in holding [the letters obtained in violation of the fourth amendment] and permit-
ting their use upon the trial,... prejudicial error was committed." Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398.
28. Id.
29. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
30. The Court had previously held, in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), that the fourteenth
amendment due process clause includes a right to be secure against unreasonable searches and
seizures similar to that specified in the fourth amendment, and that states could not deprive their
citizens of the privacy interest protected by that right. Id. at 27-28. In finding that the fourteenth
amendment "incorporated" the substance of the fourth amendment promise, the Court had refused
to find the federal "remedy" of exclusion to be an essential part of the due process clause right. Id.
at 27-29. Mapp overruled the latter conclusion, finding that due process included not only a right to
privacy like that within the fourth amendment, but also a remedy of exclusion comparable to that
enunciated in Weeks. See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655.
31. Mfapp, 367 U.S. at 648 (the Weeks Court "clearly stated that use of the seized evidence
involved 'a denial of the constitutional rights of the accused'" (quoting Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398)); id.
at 655-56 (once the right to privacy was held enforceable against the states under the due process
clause, "it was logically and constitutionally necessary that the exclusion doctrine-an essential part
of the right to privacy-be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient of th[at] right"); id. at 656
(exclusion is "the most important constitutional privilege" of the right to privacy); id. at 657 (the
holding that the exclusionary rule is an essential part of the rights guaranteed by the fourth and
fourteenth amendments is not only logical, it makes good sense); id. at 660 ("[o]ur decision" that
evidence must be excluded in state courts "gives to the individual no more than that which the
Constitution guarantees him").
32. Id. at 648 (barring the use of evidence obtained through an illegal search and seizure acts as
a "deterrent safeguard"); id. at 656 ("[Tlhe purpose [of the exclusionary rule] 'is to deter-to compel
respect for the constitutional guaranty in the only effectively available way-by removing the incen-
tive to disregard it.'" (quoting Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960))); id. at 657 ("by
admitting evidence unlawfully seized, [states] encourage disobedience to the Federal Constitution").
33. In Weeks the Court had been concerned that judges participated in law enforcement's con-
stitutional wrongs when they allowed the prosecution to employ judicial processes to secure convic-
tions based upon tainted evidence. See Weeks, 232 U.S. at 394. Thus, the Mapp Court's reliance on
judicial integrity as a reason for exclusion was foreshadowed in the original exclusionary rule
opinion.
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that an accused possesses a personal right to exclusion.34 Furthermore, while
the Court did not formally abandon the judicial integrity rationale, it did rele-
gate that premise to a clearly secondary status, making it coextensive with deter-
rence and thereby emptying it of independent force.35 This modified conception
of the foundations of the exclusionary rule has gained force and strength over
the past twenty years. According to the standard, oft-recited litany, a defendant
has no personal right to fourth amendment exclusion. 36 Suppression is not
designed to remedy a wrong or to compensate an accused. 37 Rather, it is a
forward-looking deterrent measure aimed at ensuring compliance with fourth
amendment commands by removing the incentives for or profit from transgres-
sions and informing law enforcement agents generally of the serious conse-
quences of unconstitutionality. 38 The fourth amendment remedy is designed to
discourage violations of privacy, liberty, and property interests39 that occur at
34. See, e.g., United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975); United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S.
338 (1974); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969); Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618
(1965). Although the notion of deterrence had appeared as early as 1939, see Wasserstrom & Mer-
tens, supra note 9, at 142-43 (observing that Nardone v. United States, 308 U.S. 338 (1939) "intro-
duced" the basic fourth amendment exclusionary rule deterrent rationale), it did not begin to
dominate until the late 1960s. See Wasserstrom & Mertens, supra note 9, at 152-53 (discussing the
Court's development of a solely deterrent rationale for fourth amendment exclusion).
35. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 921 n.22 (1984).
[Tihe question whether the use of illegally obtained evidence in judicial proceedings repre-
sents judicial participation in a Fourth Amendment violation and offends the integrity of
the courts 'is essentially the same as the inquiry into whether exclusion would serve a
deterrent purpose .... The analysis showing that exclusion in this case has no demon-
strated deterrent effect and is unlikely to have any significant such effect shows, by the
same reasoning, that the admission of the evidence is unlikely to encourage violations of
the Fourth Amendment.'
Id. (quoting United States v. Janis, 428 U.S. 433, 458 n.35 (1976)); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465,
485-86 (1976) (stating that the "imperative of judicial integrity" has "a limited role" and "limited
force" as a justification in determining whether to apply the exclusionary rule); Peltier, 422 U.S. at
538 (analysis of whether exclusion is necessary to promote judicial integrity "does not differ mark-
edly" from the analysis used in previous cases to determine whether deterrence is furthered by exclu-
sion); see also Stone, 428 U.S. at 491 (suggesting that indiscriminate application of the exclusionary
rule "may well have the.., effect of generating disrespect for the law and administration ofjustice");
id. at 499 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (maintaining that the judicial integrity rationale is a "rhetorical
generalization" that is "fatally flawed").
36. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 906 (exclusion is not a personal fourth amendment right); Stone, 428
U.S. at 486 (same); Calandra, 414 U.S. at 348 (same).
37. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 906 (exclusionary rule is neither intended nor able to cure invasions of
rights suffered due to unconstitutional searches and seizures); Stone, 428 U.S. at 486 (suppression is
"not calculated to redress the injury to the privacy of the victim of the search or seizure"); Calandra,
414 U.S. at 347 (purpose is not to redress the injury to the search victim); Linkletter, 381 U.S. at 637
("[r]eparation comes too late"); see also Amsterdam, Search, Seizure and Section 2255: A Comment,
112 U. PA. L. REV. 378, 388-89 (1964) (observing that the fourth amendment exclusionary rule
cannot be supported as a reparational or compensatory measure for the injured accused criminal).
38. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 906 (exclusionary rule operates as a general deterrent safeguard of
fourth amendment rights); Stone, 428 U.S. at 486 (primary justification is deterrence of police con-
duct that violates fourth amendment rights); Peltier, 422 U.S. at 538-39 (recognizing that exclusion-
ary rule is a deterrent protection of fourth amendment rights generally that works by instilling
greater care in officers involved in a given case and their future counterparts); Calandra, 414 U.S. at
347 (prime purpose is to deter police conduct that violates fourth amendment by removing the incen-
tive to engage in such conduct); see also Amsterdam, supra note 37, at 388-89 (fourth amendment
exclusion's "sole rational justification" is deterrence).
39. The fourth amendment protection against unreasonable searches and seizures protects "pri-
vacy." Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). It is not confined to privacy protection, however.
Id. at 350. The regulation of seizures of the person, for example, safeguards physical freedom and
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the time of illegal searches or seizures.40 The Court has answered every modern
question concerning the scope and operation of the fourth amendment exclu-
sionary rule by referring to its dominant deterrent purpose. 4 1
Fifth amendment cases have also given rise to exclusionary rule issues. The
suppression of evidence flows from two separate fifth amendment guarantees-
the privilege against compulsory self-incrimination and the due process clause.
Such suppression was an important, integral component of the landmark 1966
decision in Miranda v. Arizona 42 interpreting the privilege against self-incrimi-
nation.4 3 The Miranda Court prescribed an extensive set of regulations for cus-
todial interrogation, 44 then concluded that failures to comply with those
regulations would result in suppression of a suspect's statements. 45 Although
the Court did not explain explicitly the rationale for exclusion, the nature and
structure of the Miranda opinion and holding suggest that exclusion was consid-
ered a part of the fifth amendment right. The Court deemed custodial interroga-
tion inherently and presumptively compelling,46 and considered the Miranda
procedures necessary to dispel that compulsion. 47 According to the Court's rea-
soning, absent compliance with the prescriptions of Miranda, the inherent pres-
sure of custodial interrogation compels statements, and use of these statements
at trial would run afoul of the constitutional command that "[n]o person...
shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself."4 8 Ex-
clusion was essential to enforce the fifth amendment privilege and to guarantee
that defendants would not suffer the harm that the privilege prohibits. The sup-
pression of statements was no mere sanction, but an inseparable part of the de-
fendant's personal fifth amendment right.
49
liberty, and the regulation of unreasonable seizures of papers, houses, and effects shelters property
interests.
40. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 906 (the exclusionary rule is not intended to cure the constitutional
wrong that is "fully accomplished" by the unlawful search or seizure itself); Calandra, 414 U.S. at
354 (the invasion of privacy "is fully accomplished by the original search without probable cause").
41. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 908 ("Close attention to" the exclusionary rule's deterrent, "remedial
objectives has characterized our ... decisions regarding the scope of the ... rule."); Stone, 428 U.S.
at 489 n.26 (documenting fact that all modem fourth amendment exclusionary rule issues have been
resolved by deterrence-grounded cost-benefit reasoning).
42. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
43. Although the privilege arrived on the scene later than the due process clause, the similarity
of its exclusionary rule to the fourth amendment exclusionary rule makes it more appropriate to
discuss the privilege first.
44. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467-73.
45. Id. at 479.
46. Id. at 467.
47. Id. at 478-79.
48. U.S. CONsT. amend. V.
49. The Miranda opinion never suggested that exclusion was anything but a part of the fifth
amendment privilege. The entire structure of the opinion and several of its specific observations
confirm the view that the exclusion of statements secured without compliance with the Miranda
scheme was thought necessary to prevent an actual courtroom violation of the defendant's fifth
amendment right. See, e.g., Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457-58 (current custodial interrogation practices
are "at odds with" the "cherished principleI ... that the individual may not be compelled to incrim-
inate himself," and unless "adequate protective devices are employed to dispel the compulsion inher-
ent in custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant can truly be the product of
his free choice"); id. at 466 (suggesting that fifth amendment governance of pretrial settings and
Miranda protections are necessary to prevent undermining of the trial guarantee against compulsory
[Vol. 67
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The Court's attitudes toward the Miranda scheme and Miranda-based ex-
clusion have changed considerably since 1966.50 First, the Court has diminished
the stature of all Miranda requirements by emphasizing that they are "proce-
dural safeguards," "prophylactic standards," and "so-called rights," 5 1 not rights
in and of themselves.52 In addition, the Court has determined that Miranda-
based exclusion serves primarily deterrent goals. Its objective is to encourage
compliance with Miranda constraints.5 3 Despite the Court's continuing en-
dorsement of the original "presumption of compulsion,"' 54 its opinions paint an
unmistakeable picture: an accused has no constitutional right to the suppression
of evidence secured in violation of Miranda.55 Suppression of the first verbal
fruits-the immediate products of violation-is still required, but only to ensure
that some sanction will result from a Miranda violation, not to enforce an indi-
vidual defendant's fifth amendment entitlement. 56 Miranda suppression is
meant to encourage future abidance by rules promulgated to prevent compelled
self-incrimination); id. at 476 (Miranda warnings and waiver requirement are "prerequisites to the
admissibility of any statement made by a defendant," and no distinction between degrees of incrimi-
nation can be made because the "privilege . . protects the individual from being compelled to
incriminate himself in any manner; it does not distinguish degrees of incrimination"); id. at 478
(Miranda decision does not affect the admissibility of "freely and voluntarily" given or
"[v]olunteered statements" because the fifth amendment does not bar use of such statements); id. at
479 (responding to government argument that societal need for interrogation "outweighs the privi-
lege" by suggesting that the Constitution struck the balance between society and the individual in
the fifth amendment privilege which "cannot be abridged"); id. at 490-91 (rejecting the suggestion
that the Court should await legislative action regarding custodial interrogation with the observations
that courts are entrusted with enforcing "constitutional rights," and that "[w]here rights secured by
the Constitution are involved .... rule making or legislation [cannot] ... abrogate them").
50. The development of the Court's thinking in the Miranda exclusion area has paralleled the
development of its thinking in the fourth amendment area. In both, strong initial indications that
exclusion was a right have given way to overriding emphases of purely deterrent theories.
51. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 309 (1985) (referring to "errors made ... in administer-
ing the prophylactic Miranda procedures"); Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 297 (1980) (Mi-
randa found certain "procedural safeguards" necessary to protect the fifth amendment privilege); id.
at 294 (the officer advised defendant of his "so-called" Miranda rights); Michigan v. Tucker, 417
U.S. 433, 446 (1974) (police conduct departed from the "prophylactic standards" of Miranda).
52. See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 305 (Miranda Court recognized that its prescriptions were not
themselves constitutional rights); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654 (1984) (same); Tucker,
417 U.S. at 444 (same).
53. See Tucker, 417 U.S. at 447 ("By refusing to admit evidence gained as a result of [a Mi-
randa violation], the [c]ourts hope to instill ... a greater degree of care towards the rights of the
accused" in officers conducting custodial interrogations); id. at 448-49 (exclusion of third party's
statements will not significantly augment the "deterrent effect" of excluding defendant's own
statements).
54. See, e.g., Elstad, 470 U.S. at 307 ("failure to administer the Miranda warnings creates a
presumption of compulsion" that is "irrebutable for purposes of the prosecution's case in chief"); id.
at 317 ("Court has carefully adhered to th[e] principle" that "answers received" from custodial
interrogation without Miranda compliance must "be presumed compelled").
55. See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 307 ("Miranda's preventive medicine provides a remedy even to the
defendant who has suffered no identifiable constitutional harm"); Quarles, 467 U.S. at 658 n.7 ("ab-
sent actual coercion by the officer there is no constitutional imperative requiring the exclusion of
evidence that results from" unwarned custodial interrogation) (emphasis added).
56. The Court's continuing designation of the first verbal fruits as presumptively compelled is
its way of announcing that ordinarily they may not be used at trial. See Elstad, 470 U.S. at 307 (as a
result of the failure to comply with Miranda a "presumption of compulsion" arises, and "unwarned
statements that are otherwise voluntary... must be excluded from evidence .. "). By suppressing
the immediate products, the Court provides a certain encouragement for Miranda compliance.
Without such guaranteed consequences, the incentives for adherence to the Miranda scheme would
be weak, and an aging Miranda could become truly toothless.
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self-incrimination. In sum, deterrence of future conduct has come to rule the
Miranda roost.
5 7
The fifth amendment due process clause also yields exclusionary conse-
quences. Though less explicitly explained than the logic of fourth amendment
and Miranda suppression, the logic of due process suppression is apparent.58
Since 1936 involuntary or coerced confessions have been constitutionally barred
from criminal trials.59 From Brown v. Mississippi60 to Colorado v. Connelly,6t
the Court has held that the guarantee of due process prohibits state and federal
authorities from fueling criminal processes with admissions coerced by physical
or psychological means. 6
2
One undoubted benefit of suppressing involuntary statements is that it cre-
ates a strong disincentive for coercive tactics. Exclusion protects the safety and
dignity-the life and liberty-of future suspects by its clear, and constitutionally
desirable, deterrent message.63 The primary reason for excluding coerced ad-
missions, however, is that their use against defendants at trial is intrinsically
57. The modem Miranda doctrine exclusionary rule opinions bear a resemblance to their
fourth amendment cousins. The essentially deterrent focus has yielded decisions that reflect cost-
benefit balancing of the gains in deterrent force against the costs of lost evidence and convictions.
See, e.g., Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 448, 450-51 (1974) (relying on lack of significant aug-
mentation of deterrence from exclusion of testimony of witness discovered as a result of suspect's
unwarned statements, and "balancing the interests" in "making available to the trier of fact all
concededly relevant and trustworthy evidence" and "'in the effective prosecution of criminals'"
against "the need to provide an effective sanction to a constitutional right"); Harris v. New York,
401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971) ("Assuming that the exclusionary rule has a deterrent effect on proscribed
police conduct, sufficient deterrence flows when the evidence in question is made unavailable to the
prosecution in its case in chief.").
58. Although majority reasoning is clear, the Court has divided over the legitimate constitu-
tional bases of fourth amendment and Miranda exclusion. See, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298,
308 (1985) (Miranda suppression is deterrent device); id. at 354 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (Miranda
suppression is part of fifth amendment entitlement); Leon, 468 U.S. at 906 (fourth amendment exclu-
sion is solely a deterrent safeguard); id. at 938 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (exclusion is part of fourth
amendment right). In contrast, the less thoroughly explained coerced confession doctrine has not
split the Court.
59. Prior to 1936 a nonconstitutional rule of evidence prohibited coerced confessions. The ra-
tionale for the evidentiary bar was the untrustworthiness of such admissions. See 0. STEPHENS, THE
SUPREME COURT AND CONFESSIONS OF GUILT 20 (1973) (" '[A] confession forced from the mind
by the flattery of hope, or by the torture of fear, comes in so questionable a shape when it is to be
considered as the evidence of guilt, that no credit ought to be given to it; and therefore it is re-
jected.'" (quoting King v. Warickshall, I Leach 263, 263-64, 168 Eng. Rep. 234, 235 (K.B. 1783))).
60. 297 U.S. 276 (1936).
61. 479 U.S. 157 (1986). Actually, Brown, Connelly, and the state cases cited below are based
upon the fourteenth amendment due process clause. In identical terms, the fifth and fourteenth
amendments provide identical protection against coerced confessions to federal and state defendants,
respectively.
62. See, e.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) (reversing conviction where statements
were coerced from suspect in hospital); Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35 (1967) (statement obtained
under gunpoint); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433 (1961) (statement obtained after four days of interroga-
tion); Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199 (1960) (statement obtained after eight hours of interroga-
tion); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) (same; defendant requested counsel repeatedly);
Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944) (statement obtained after thirty-six hours of interroga.
tion); see also 0. STEPHENS, supra note 59, at 31-62 (discussing and reviewing the Court's develop-
ment of the coerced confession-"fair trial" doctrine during the 1930s and 1940s).
63. Cf. Blackburn, 361 U.S. at 207 (among the values at stake in claims involving coerced
confessions is "preservation of the individual's freedom of will").
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antithetical to the "fundamental fairness" promise of due process.64 Coerced
confessions generate unfairness in two basic senses. They threaten to produce
unreliable outcomes and thus the conviction of innocents. 65 Moreover, they re-
sult from methods that civilized society abhors: inquisitorial techniques that
exploit the weak and threaten the dignity and autonomy of the individual. 66
When criminal processes rely on the products of such "unfair play" by law en-
forcement, the resulting convictions-no matter how "reliable"-are infected
with unfairness. They are inconsistent with a system devoted to "due"
process. 67
The rationale for due process suppression is critically different from the
deterrent premise of fourth amendment and Miranda exclusion. The due pro-
cess provisions confer a constitutional entitlement to freedom from unfair judi-
cial procedures. 68 The exclusion of involuntary statements cannot be a mere
future-oriented deterrent measure, for it is an inherent, inseparable element of
fifth and fourteenth amendment rights.69 The regulatory purposes of the fourth
64. See Mincey, 437 U.S. at 398 ("any criminal trial use against a defendant of his involuntary
statement is a denial of due process of law .... ") (emphasis by the Court); Blackburn, 361 U.S. at
211 ("the use of this evidence to convict ... transgressed the imperatives of fundamental justice
.... ); id. at 206 ("the Fourteenth Amendment forbids 'fundamental unfairness in the use of evi-
dence, whether true or false.'" (quoting Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219, 236 (1941))); Spano,
360 U.S. at 320 ("use of the confession obtained here [is] inconsistent with the Fourteenth Amend-
ment under traditional principles.").
65. See Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 444 (1961) (coercive conditions made resistance seem use-
less "whether [the suspect] was guilty or not," and therefore his confession had little "independent
significance"); Blackburn, 361 U.S. at 207 (convicting defendant affronted the "most basic sense of
justice" due to the "unreliability of the confession"); Spano, 360 U.S. at 320 ("The abhorrence of
society to the use of involuntary confessions does not turn alone on their inherent untrustworthi-
ness"); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 496-97 (1976) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (coerced statements
are excluded because they are "inherently dubious" and "lack ... reliability"); see also Colorado v.
Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 182 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("No other class of evidence is so pro-
foundly prejudicial" as a defendant's confession.).
66. See Blackburn, 361 U.S. at 207 ("As important as it is that persons who have committed
crimes be convicted, there are considerations which transcend the question of guilt or innocence.
Thus, in cases involving involuntary confessions, this Court enforces the strongly felt attitude of our
society that important human values are sacrificed" when the government coerces a confession to
secure a conviction.); Spano, 360 U.S. at 320.
67. See Spano, 360 U.S. at 320-21.
[W]e find use of the confession obtained here inconsistent with the Fourteenth Amendment
under traditional principles.
The abhorrence of society to the use of involuntary confessions does not turn alone on
their inherent untrustworthiness. It also turns on the deep-rooted feeling that the police
must obey the law while enforcing the law; that in the end life and liberty can be as much
endangered [by] illegal methods used to convict those thought to be criminals as from the
actual criminals themselves.
Id.
68. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 685 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting) (observing that the due
process clause exclusion of coerced confessions reflects a constitutional "procedural right").
69. The right not to be deprived of life or liberty without due process of law would seem to
include a promise that the government will not subject an individual to coercive out-of-court tech-
niques. See Blackburn, 361 U.S. at 206-07 (observing that "important human values are sacrificed
where an agency of the government, in the course of securing a conviction, wrings a confession out
of an accused against his will[,]" and referring to one of those values as "the preservation of the
individual's freedom of will"). If so, an additional reason for due process exclusion would be to
discourage future transgressions of that promise. Moreover, whether or not there is an out-of-court
deprivation of the right, such deterrence might be desirable to cut down on the risks that coercion
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amendment and Miranda exclusionary rules have enabled the Court to balance
costs against benefits 70 and to define exceptions that often permit the use of
improperly obtained information. The Court's due process opinions contain no
similar deterrent reliance or cost-benefit balancing, and no exceptions to the ba-
sic command of exclusion. Instead, the Court's due process opinions have con-
sistently proscribed all use of truly coerced statements.7 1 The exclusion of
coerced confessions is a personal right, for the use of involuntary statements at
trial contravenes the promise of fundamentally fair procedure that is the essence
of due process. 72 The Constitution can tolerate no less than suppression.
In sum, the bar to use of coerced confessions, unlike fourth amendment or
Miranda suppression, is not attributable to a judicially created exclusionary rule,
but is based on a personal, constitutional exclusionary right. This significant
distinction between an individual right to suppression and a general, systemic
exclusionary sanction is a crucial predicate for discussion of the character of
Massiah-based exclusion. 73
B. Sixth Amendment Exclusion: The Court's View
The rationale for sixth amendment suppression is not at all clear. The
Court has failed to rationalize Massiah-based exclusion with clarity or consis-
tency, 74 proffering deficient and potentially contradictory explanations. 75 Os-
tensibly, only one of the Court's Massiah decisions is an "exclusionary rule
will be used, but not detected at trial. The textual discussion is not meant to deny that deterrence is
an objective, but only to deny that it is the sole or primary objective of due process exclusion.
70. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 488 (1976) (noting that exclusionary rule policies are not
absolute, but must be evaluated in light of competing policies, and discussing the balancing process
at work in the Court's exclusionary rule cases); see also Amsterdam, supra note 37, at 389 (noting
that application of exclusionary rule reaches a point of "diminishing returns").
71. See Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398 (1978) ("any criminal trial use" of a coerced
confession is a denial of due process) (emphasis in original); see also New Jersey v. Portash, 440 U.S.
450, 459 (1979) ("Balancing ... is impermissible" when the question is the admission of compelled
statements because, like the due process clause, the privilege against self-incrimination prohibits any
testimonial use of compelled statements).
72. As noted earlier, although deterrence of out-of-court coercion may also be an ancillary goal,
due process exclusion is primarily a right, not a device to prevent future constitutional violations that
only occur in out-of-court contexts.
73. Members of the Court have found comparison and contrast of fourth, fifth, and sixth
amendment exclusion to be analytically useful. See, e.g., Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 425
(1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 208-10 (1964) (White, J.,
dissenting); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 682 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
74. See Comment, Application of the Impeachment Exception to the Sixth Amendment Exclu-
sionary Rule: Seeking a Resolution Based on the Substance of the Right to Counsel, 50 ALB. L. REv.
343, 376 n.241 (1986) (Court unthinkingly expanded exclusionary rule under the fourth amendment
to other constitutional rights without providing "a clear rationale for doing so"). The continuing
failure to provide a thorough and defensible constitutional explanation of the Massiah doctrine has
left its right to counsel vulnerable to attacks by opponents. See Tomkovicz, supra note 8, at 22-30
(noting the lack of "an in-depth constitutional justification for the Massiah right" and describing the
views of opponents of the Massiah right). If exclusion is a part of the sixth amendment right then
the Court's analytical deficiencies regarding exclusion are really a part of its larger failure to ration-
alize the Massiah right to counsel.
75. The Justices may well be uncertain, even confused, about the true character of sixth amend-
ment exclusion.
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opinion."'76 Put otherwise, in only one case has the Court's decision turned on
whether an acknowledged transgression of sixth amendment standards should
breed exclusionary consequences.
The Court's Massiah jurisprudence, however, is not lacking in references to
the question of exclusion. Exclusion was the focus of the Court's first announce-
ment of a right to counsel against pretrial government elicitation in Massiah.
Justice Stewart's brief majority opinion did suggest that post-indictment, pretrial
"interrogation," whether secret or overt, could itself violate the accused's right
to counsel.77 His clearly worded bottom line, however, was that Massiah "was
denied the basic protections of [the sixth amendment right to counsel] when
there was used against him at his trial evidence of his own incriminating words,
which federal agents had deliberately elicited from him after he had been in-
dicted and in the absence of his counsel."7 8 In fact, the Court did "not question
that . . . it was entirely proper to continue an investigation of the suspected
criminal activities of the defendant" after indictment, and reiterated that it was
only holding "that the defendant's own incriminating statements ... could not
constitutionally be used ... as evidence against him at his trial."'79
These explicit and unambiguous conclusions indicate that the Massiah
Court believed that a sixth amendment violation occurred at the time of, and
only at the time of, admission at trial of the fruits of an uncounseled pretrial
encounter. The original Massiah majority apparently viewed sixth amendment
exclusion as a personal right, a necessary part of the promise of counsel, and not
as a preventive safeguard against future pretrial counsel deprivations.80
From the start, dissenting Justices have objected to the exclusion of evi-
dence in Massiah cases.8 ' They have opposed a right to exclusion and have
maintained that the only valid exclusionary reasoning, deterrence-oriented cost-
benefit balancing, militates against suppression in Massiah cases.82 Nonetheless,
majority opinions have seemed to adhere to the original Massiah view that the
use of disclosures in court threatens sixth amendment values and, therefore, that
76. See Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431,446-47 (1984). In Nix, the accused directed the police to
the location of the body of a homicide victim. At the time, the accused did not have the assistance of
counsel and had not validly waived his right to counsel. Id. There was no question that the actual
discovery of the body was the result of a Massiah violation. Nonetheless, because the victim's body
"would inevitably have been discovered" by a lawful police search that was underway at the time the
accused led the officers to the body, the Court concluded that the evidence derived from it did not
have to be excluded at trial.
77. See Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201, 204 (1964).
78. Id. at 206 (emphasis added).
79. Id. at 207.
80. See Wasserstrom & Mertens, supra note 9, at 175 (Massiah itself strongly suggested that the
sixth amendment violation occurs in court, not out of court).
81. See Massiah, 377 U.S. at 211 (White, J., dissenting) ("Applying the new exclusionary rule is
peculiarly inappropriate in this case.").
82. See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 191-92 (1985) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); United States
v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264, 296 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387,
424-26 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Massiah, 377 U.S. at 208 (White, J., dissenting). Chief
Justice Burger has cast substantial portions of his Massiah dissents in exclusionary rule terms. See,
e.g., Moulton, 474 U.S. at 190-92 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); Williams, 430 U.S. at 420-29 (Burger,
C.J., dissenting).
1989]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67
exclusion is part of the constitutional right.8 3 In general, majority opinions have
not framed resolutions of sixth amendment claims in exclusionary rule terms,
and the concept of deterrence has been noticeably absent. The one very signifi-
cant exception is Nix v. Williams.8 4
Nix involved evidence derived from police conduct that the Court had pre-
viously declared violative of Massiah standards. 8 5 The Court, therefore, was
forced to address sixth amendment exclusion directly. The result was an unfor-
tunate blurring of the nature of sixth amendment exclusion. By resorting to
deterrent-based, cost-benefit analysis in deciding whether evidence that inevita-
bly would have been discovered should be admissible, the Court contradicted
prior suggestions and indicated that Massiah suppression, like its fourth amend-
ment and Miranda counterparts, is not an individual right, but a general disin-
centive for uncounseled elicitations.8 6 The Court then confused matters by
entertaining defendant's contention that sixth amendment exclusion, unlike
fourth amendment exclusion, is not a future-oriented deterrent, but a present
protection of "the right to a fair trial and the integrity of the factfinding pro-
cess.' ' 87 It neither endorsed nor rejected a sixth amendment right to exclusion,
but simply reasoned that an inevitable discovery exception was wholly consistent
with right-based exclusion. 8
83. See Moulton, 474 U.S. at 161 (phrasing question in case as whether sixth amendment right
of defendant was violated by admission at trial of his uncounseled statements); id. at 179 (endorsing
Massiah conclusion that it was proper for government to continue to investigate, but improper to use
information gained against the accused at the trial of the charged crime); see also Williams, 430 U.S.
at 422-23 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (recognizing that Court majority apparently perceives that the
function of exclusion under the sixth amendment is different than its function under the fourth
amendment). I say that Court majorities have seemed to adhere to the original view because the
Court has not been explicit about the reasoning beneath exclusion in its Massiah opinions, and be-
cause its language has more than once suggested that a constitutional violation occurs at the time of
the pretrial elicitation. See Moulton, 474 U.S. at 174 (observing that in United States v. Henry, 447
U.S. 264 (1980), the Court held the sixth amendment right to counsel violated by intentional crea-
tion of a situation likely to induce incriminating revelations); id. at 176 (sixth amendment is violated
when the state obtains incriminating statements by knowingly circumventing right to counsel); id at
177-78 n.13 (Moulton had a constitutional right not to reveal information to the state); id. at 177 n. 14
(sixth amendment protects right not to be confronted and was violated as soon as defendant was
engaged in conversation); id. at 180 (evidence is inadmissible if the state violated the sixth amend-
ment in obtaining it). Still, the majority opinions have never denied that exclusion at trial is a part of
the sixth amendment right.
84. 467 U.S. 431 (1984).
85. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 400-01, 405 (1977) (holding that detective had delib-
erately elicited admissions absent counsel and that a knowing and voluntary waiver of the sixth
amendment right had not been established).
86. See Nix, 467 U.S. at 442-43 (core rationale consistently advanced by Court for drastic and
societally expensive extensions of exclusionary rule to fruits of violations has been deterrence); see
also Wasserstrom & Mertens, supra note 9, at 179 (Nix Court "deprecat[ed] the Massiah rule by
relegating it to the same low level that Mapp and Weeks presently occupy in the Court's estima-
tion"). Oddly enough, the strongly pro-Massiah majority opinion in Moulton, by repeatedly sug-
gesting that the Constitution is offended by the uncounseled pretrial elicitations, furnishes support
for the Nix conclusion that exclusion is necessary to deter future sixth amendment transgressions.
See Moulton, 474 U.S. at 174, 176, 177 n.13, 177-78 n.14, 180.
87. See Nix, 467 U.S. at 446.
88. See id. The Court, which had already endorsed a deterrence rationale, thereby rejecting the
claim that deterrence is not a sixth amendment goal, seemed to be assuming, arguendo, that sixth
amendment exclusion was a matter of personal right. It most certainly did not validate the position
that exclusion is a right-a position that had not been questioned by a majority since the Massiah
Court first espoused it. See Wasserstrom & Mertens, supra note 9, at 177 n.514 (Court's brief atten-
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In Nix the Court wasted an opportunity to fix firmly and clearly the consti-
tutional rationale for Massiah suppression. It could have established a solid
foundation for resolving several unaddressed exclusionary issues. Still, the Nix
Court did bring the central issue into sharp focus: Is the exclusion of evidence
acquired in violation of Massiah doctrine a personal sixth amendment right of
the individual defendant who is denied counsel in the pretrial encounter or a
deterrent sanction intended to promote general, systemic compliance with Mas-
siah dictates, and to prevent future uncounseled pretrial encounters?89
C. Sixth Amendment Exclusion: The Constitution's View
There are three possible conceptualizations of sixth amendment exclusion.
It may be solely a deterrent measure intended to protect out-of-court rights or to
promote compliance with out-of-court regulations. 90 It may simply be part and
parcel of the in-court right to the assistance of counsel. Or it may be a combined
deterrent safeguard and right.9 1 A choice among these alternatives requires a
return to the premises of the adversary system underlying the pretrial Massiah
right.92
If the earlier description of the pretrial right to counsel defined by Massiah
doctrine is correct, it is neither more nor less than a necessary temporal exten-
sion of the adversary system guarantee of trial counsel. 93 Trial counsel is a
multi-purpose equalizer who zealously conducts the affirmative and defensive
maneuvers best designed to assist the accused's cause. Counsel is a legal and
pragmatic sword and shield in the battle against all state endeavors to convict
her client.
tion to the right-based argument in Nix was only a nod in that direction that "failed to deter [it], in
the rest of its opinion, from treating the Massiah exclusionary rule as a carbon copy of the [fourth
amendment] rule.").
The Court found the inevitable discovery exception consistent with right-based exclusion be-
cause in such cases the evidence introduced at trial is thought to be no different than the evidence
that would have been introduced without official impropriety. Since the trial is unaffected by the
misconduct, there can be no damage to fairness, factfinding, or any other aspect of the trial that
counsel is supposed to monitor. See Nix, 467 U.S. at 446-47.
89. Or is it, like due process exclusion of coerced confessions, a combination of the two? Unlike
another analyst of Massiah exclusion, see Comment, supra note 74, at 376 n.241 (if purpose of sixth
amendment exclusion is to ensure a fair trial, it conflicts with the deterrent rationale), I do not
believe that the two rationales are incompatible.
90. In that case it would be analogous to fourth amendment or Miranda exclusion.
91. It would then resemble due process suppression of coerced confessions. I have previously
proffered such a dual purpose conception of due process suppression. See supra text accompanying
notes 69-72.
It could also be viewed as a compensatory method of paying a defendant back for an out-of-
court denial of counsel. But that view seems implausible. There is no reason to think that the Con-
stitution contemplates that an accused who has suffered an out-of-court wrong at the hands of the
government should be compensated by an increased chance for acquittal. For a similar rejection of a
compensatory rationale in the fourth amendment area, see supra note 37 and accompanying text.
Moreover, the conclusion below that there is no out-of-court sixth amendment injury further under-
mines the compensatory argument. See infra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
92. See supra notes 16-24 and accompanying text.
93. Again, the discussion that follows is a summary of a lengthier analysis presented in an
earlier treatment of the Massiah right's character. See Tomkovicz, supra note 8, at 39-62. Once
again, specific citations to that piece will not be provided for each point reiterated here.
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If the prosecution sought to speak with the accused at trial, with or without
the presence of the jury,94 the accused would undoubtedly be entitled to his
lawyer's input concerning the advisability of disclosures. The state may not ap-
proach the defendant in this manner unless it affords him the opportunity for
counsel's assistance. It may not deny, restrict, or avoid counsel's protection.
Neither may the state conceal the adversarial nature of an encounter by masking
its adversarial identity behind the visage of a private party, thereby depriving the
defendant of the opportunity for counsel's aid. Rather, the state is constitution-
ally bound to conduct open dealings with an equalized adversary.
According to Massiah doctrine, if the right to courtroom equalization is to
be preserved, the state should not have unlimited pretrial opportunities to con-
front its unequal adversary in quest of incriminating evidence. Sixth amendment
substance could be destroyed if conduct barred in the courtroom-attempts to
elicit inculpation from an uncounseled adversary-could be engaged in before
trial, and the fruits could be carried into the courtroom and served to the trier.
Massiah prevents the circumvention of the trial guarantee that would be possible
if the government could "temporally split" its conduct and thereby accomplish
its overall objective: to induce the uncounseled accused to reveal his guilt to the
trier. It prevents the state from doing what the sixth amendment forbids, from
harming constitutionally sheltered interests by expediently restructuring its
course of conduct.
Appropriate resolution of exclusionary issues requires inquiry into what the
sixth amendment forbids and what interests trial counsel's equalizing assistance
is meant to protect. If my view of sixth amendment values is correct, then coun-
sel protects against the adversarial contest advantages-the substantial boosts
toward victory-that the state would secure by dealing with an uncounseled,
unadvised, and unwise opponent.9 5 By granting an equalizer we declare our
commitment to fair play in a contest between roughly balanced opposing sides.
The value of adversarial fair play for the defendant and for society, however, is
not simply the intrinsic satisfaction derived from adherence to our system's rules
and procedures. Counsel's worth lies not simply in her delivery of advice or her
comforting presence. Rather, equalizing counsel bestows real, subtantive bene-
fits and tangible, measurable gains for the accused's defense against a criminal
charge. When counsel succeeds with an evidentiary objection, the odds against
conviction improve. When counsel prevails on a motion to suppress illegally
seized evidence, the risk of conviction diminishes. When counsel advises the
accused not to accede to the prosecution's request to reveal incriminating knowl-
edge to the trier of fact, the case for conviction suffers. Clearly, preventing dam-
age to the chances for acquittal is an important and valuable benefit of the fair
play counsel ensures.96 Counsel's advice not to cooperate with the state by di-
94. The same observations and conclusions apply to bench trials in which judges are the triers
of f ct.
95. See Wasserstrom & Mertens, supra note 9, at 177 (describing the harm against which coun-
sel protects a defendant as a "litigative advantage" for the prosecution).
96. Those chances for acquittal begin with and are reflected in our presumption of innocence
and the imposition of the burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt upon the government.
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vulging inculpatory information in court guarantees that the government will
shoulder the entire burden of proving guilt without assistance from its
adversary. 97
The foregoing analysis of trial counsel's assistance suggests that Massiah
doctrine exclusion is, as the Court originally implied,98 a constitutional right of
the uncounseled defendant who divulges incriminating information before trial.
Massiah extends the trial right into pretrial adversarial settings to safeguard the
most valuable benefit of trial counsel: the prevention of evidentiary damage to
the defense. To preserve the primary value of the trial guarantee against pretrial
erosion-Massiah's mission-the Massiah entitlement must include not only the
"process" of pretrial assistance, but also the substantive benefits of counsel's
aid. 99 The harms that counsel is empowered and commissioned to prevent oc-
cur when the trier of fact receives and relies upon the incriminating pretrial
disclosures. 10°  Consequently, when admissions elicited in violation of Massiah
are introduced at trial or otherwise used to the defendant's disadvantage in the
process of determining guilt or innocence, the defendant suffers an actual depri-
vation of valuable sixth amendment benefits. 10 1
Arguments for a strictly deterrent rationale for sixth amendment exclusion
rely on faulty premises. They presume that all rules of exclusion based on pre-
trial official misconduct share the same nature. They assume that because the
fourth amendment and Miranda rules rest solely on deterrent policies, 10 2 sixth
97. Cf. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966) (goals of privilege against self-incrimina-
tion are "[t]o maintain a 'fair state-individual balance,' [and] to require the government 'to shoulder
the entire load'" (quoting 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW 317 (McNaugh-
ton rev. ed. 1961))).
98. See Massiah, 377 U.S. at 204, 206-07.
99. The former Chief Justice was simply wrong in concluding that Massiah exclusion costs
society much while providing "precious little in the way of offsetting 'benefits.'" See Maine v.
Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 191 (1985) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The benefits are those at the core of
our right to counsel.
100. See Wasserstrom & Mertens, supra note 9, at 176 (Massiah is "directly concerned with the
balance of litigative advantages between the prosecution and the defense at trial."). It has been
suggested that we must be cautious about applying "the drastic bar of exclusion" to situations that
already involve extension of the trial right to counsel into pretrial realms. See Brewer v. Williams,
430 U.S. 387, 426 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). I disagree. If we have found pretrial extension a
necessity to preserve the trial right, it makes little sense to acknowledge an entitlement to assistance,
but to allow frequent deprivation of the real benefits of that assistance. Such would be the conse-
quence of a "cautious" approach to the exclusion of evidence secured by taking advantage of un-
counseled defendants.
101. See Schulhofer, Confessions and the Court, 79 MICH. L. REV. 865, 889-90 (1981) (the ad-
mission of evidence obtained in violation of Massiah at trial constitutes a denial of the constitutional
right to counsel); Wasserstrom & Mertens, supra note 9, at 175 (admission "may well itself violate
the defendant's constitutional right" to counsel); Comment, supra note 74, at 384-88 (sixth amend-
ment right and remedy of exclusion cannot be separated as in fourth amendment context; violation
of right and remedy of exclusion are "intertwined" and "nearly inseparable"; right to fair trial is
damaged only when evidence secured in uncounseled encounter is admitted at trial; admission of
evidence obtained in violation of Massiah effects a "new and separate" constitutional wrong or depri-
vation).
The point made in the text mirrors the argument forcefully made by the defendant in Nix, 467
U.S. at 441, 446 (defendant maintains that exclusion is part of his right to a fair trial guaranteed by
sixth amendment).
102. My descriptions of the Court's rationalizations of fourth amendment and Miranda exclu-
sion are not meant to indicate agreement with the Court's views. I am not at all sure that those two
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amendment exclusion must be similarly grounded.10 3 This assumption over-
looks the acknowledged distinction between the fourth amendment and Miranda
rules and the due process right to exclude coerced confessions. 14 More to the
point, it ignores critical differences in the underlying rights.10 5
The fourth amendment is not tied to the operation of the adversary sys-
tem. 0 6 Moreover, pretrial fourth amendment protection is not the result of
temporal extension of a trial process right. Rather, the amendment protects pri-
vacy, liberty, and property at all times and in all settings.10 7 Harm to fourth
amendment interests occurs, and is fully accomplished, when an illegal search or
exclusionary rules ought to be viewed as deterrents only. For purposes of the instant analysis of
sixth amendment exclusion, however, I accept the current fourth amendment and Miranda explana-
tions, and contrast Massiah-based exclusion with those two grounds for exclusion.
103. See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 190-92 (1985) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (contending,
based on fourth amendment precedent and deterrent, cost-benefit analysis borrowed from that
realm, that sixth amendment exclusion "makes little sense"); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 415-
26 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (lengthy discussion of inappropriateness of application of exclu-
sionary sanction in sixth amendment context that is grounded throughout upon deterrence oriented,
cost-benefit reasoning and analogies to fourth amendment and Miranda exclusionary analysis); id. at
437-38 (White, J., dissenting) (explaining majority outcome as based on deterrence and referring to
the "prophylactic rule" ofMassiah); Massiah, 377 U.S. at 208-09, 213 (White, J., dissenting) (analo-
gizing sixth amendment exclusion to fourth amendment exclusion, and complaining about the
Court's "newly fashioned exclusionary principle" and the "prophylactic effect of another exclusion-
ary rule").
Proponents of a deterrence basis for Massiah exclusion have suggested that there may well be
more than one type of sixth amendment violation, and that the pure deterrence rationale may only
be applicable to exclusion based on one of those types. See Moulton, 474 U.S. at 192 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) (sixth amendment claims in this case seem to "'closely parallel claims under the Fourth
Amendment'" (quoting Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 414 (1977) (Powell, J., concurring)));
Williams, 430 U.S. at 414 (Powell, J., concurring) (suggesting that some sixth amendment claims
resemble fourth amendment exclusionary claims and some do not). Apparently, they would enter-
tain the possibility of a constitutional right to exclusion for those sixth amendment claims that are
unlike fourth amendment claims. That right to exclusion would seem to arise only in the exceed-
ingly rare case in which a denial of counsel leads to coerced or unreliable disclosures.
In my view, all sixth amendment deprivations are materially alike for purposes of exclusion.
All involve threats to the fairness of a criminal trial whether or not coercion or evidentiary unrelia-
bility has resulted from the denial of counsel. Those who would distinguish between different types
of sixth amendment deprivations view adversary system "fairness" and the interests and values shel-
tered by the right to counsel too narrowly. The right to counsel is not simply another safeguard
against coercion or a mere assurance of accuracy in the determination of guilt or innocence. See
Tomkovicz, supra note 8, at 49-50. Sixth amendment fairness is jeopardized whenever products of
an imbalanced adversarial pretrial encounter are employed at trial- even if those products are trust-
worthy and have been acquired without coercion. See Schulhofer, supra note 101, at 889-90 (relia-
bility is beside the point since use of Massiah-violative disclosures "taints the judicial proceedings in
a fundamental way").
104. See supra text accompanying notes 68-73.
105. See Comment, supra note 74, at 378 (suggesting that the Court's extension of fourth
amendment and fifth amendment exclusionary doctrine into the sixth amendment realm has not
taken into account differences between the rights); cf. Nix, 467 U.S. at 455-56 (Stevens, J., concur-
ring) (stating that the Court's reliance, in a Massiah context, upon the "now-familiar plaint that
'[t]he criminal is to go free because the constable has blundered,' is entirely beside the point," and
that the majority's "[g]eneralizations about the exclusionary rule . . . simply do not address the
primary question in the present sixth amendment case before it" (citations omitted)).
106. See Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 374 (1986) ("Although it is frequently invoked
in criminal trials, the Fourth Amendment is not a trial right; the protection it affords against govern-
mental intrusion into one's home and affairs pertains to all citizens."); United States v. Praetorius,
457 F. Supp. 329, 334 (E.D.N.Y. 1978) ("The Fourth Amendment does not speak of proceedings in
court and is not a protection merely to those accused of crime. It protects the interest of every
person in their [sic] privacy.").
107. Of course, the fourth amendment's coverage is limited by the terms and intent of the right it
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seizure takes place.' 0 8 The fourth amendment does not include an entitlement
to evidentiary exclusion because none of its core interests-privacy, liberty, and
property-is damaged at the time illegally derived evidence is used in court.' 0 9
Similarly, if Miranda's requirements really are mere "prophylactic rules"
rather than actual extensions of the fifth amendment privilege, then no constitu-
tional harm results from the use of Miranda-violative admissions at trial. The
fifth amendment does grant a process right not to be forced to incriminate one-
self and the Miranda scheme is a pretrial outgrowth and safeguard of that right.
However, because the products of Miranda violations are not thought to be "ac-
tually" compelled, but are only "presumptively" compelled, the accused's inter-
est in preventing conviction by his own compelled testimony is not damaged by
the use of those products."10
Massiah, on the other hand, defines a pretrial extension of the adversary
system right to trial counsel. It is not a mere regulatory scheme designed to
avoid the risks of deprivation of the trial right,"' but a temporal extension of
sixth amendment control-an extension that is necessary to prevent actual dep-
rivations of the trial right. The interests it protects and the harms it prevents are
substantive and procedural trial interests and harms. While uncounseled out-of-
court elicitation is essential for a sixth amendment Massiah violation, the viola-
tion is completed, and the deprivation of counsel's benefits is fully realized, when
uncounseled pretrial admissions are introduced at trial." 12 To prevent the viola-
tion of a defendant's right to counsel, those admissions must be excluded. Ex-
clusion, therefore, is an integral part of the sixth amendment entitlement."13
promises. The point here is that there is no built-in temporal or spatial limitation similar to the sixth
amendment's confinement to the adversary process.
108. See supra note 40.
109. There are plausible arguments to the contrary. Justice Brennan has contended that exclu-
sion is a necessary part of fourth amendment protection. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,
933-34 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (maintaining that the fourth amendment is furthered by the
use of evidence at trial, and, therefore, that exclusion is a part of the constitutional right); see also
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 510 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (observing that he had previously
"rejected ... the premise that an individual has no constitutional right to have unconstitutionally
seized evidence excluded"). Justice Brennan's dissenting view is in accord with the original under-
standing of fourth amendment exclusion. See supra notes 25-28 and accompanying text.
110. See supra notes 54-56 and accompanying text.
I 11. See Schulhofer, supra note 101, at 889 (Massiah exclusion "is not merely a prophylactic
device; it is not designed to reduce the risk of actual constitutional violations").
112. But see Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 191 (1985) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (sixth amend-
ment wrong was fully accomplished at the time of the elicitation, and exclusion is neither intended
nor able to cure the pretrial invasion of rights).
113. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
Proponents of a purely deterrent rationale for Massiah exclusion seem to place considerable
reliance on the fact that evidence suppressed on sixth amendment grounds, like fourth amendment
and Miranda-violative evidence, is ordinarily uncoerced, reliable, and probative. See, e.g., Maine v.
Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 186, 191 (1985) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (chastising the Court for excluding
"highly probative and reliable evidence," and suggesting that evidence obtained in Massiah contexts
is typically reliable and often the most probative evidence); United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264,
280 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing the "high price" of the sixth amendment exclusion of
"reliable evidence"); Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 426 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (be-
cause the disclosures were unquestionably reliable and voluntary, "fairness" does not demand or
require their suppression); id. at 423 (since risks of "unreliability" and threats to free will or dignity
of the individual are not present, suppression is not justified); Massiah, 377 U.S. at 208 (White, J.,
dissenting) (the evidence being suppressed is relevant, reliable, and highly probative, and without it
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It is possible that Massiah exclusion, like due process exclusion,11 4 has two
functions: to prevent the present in-court violation of a constitutional right and
to discourage future out-of-court violations of that right.' 15 A deterrent objec-
"the quest for truth may be seriously impeded"); id. at 213 (the evidence might be the best possible
way of "discharging [the] responsibility for ascertaining the truth").
Apparently, that similarity to the consequences of fourth amendment and Miranda suppression
leads proponents to conclude that the rationale of most, if not all, sixth amendment suppression
should resemble the rationale of those other two varieties of suppression. See Williams, 430 U.S. at
423-24 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (Since we balance costs against benefits in Miranda exclusion situa-
tions, we should balance in Massiah exclusion contexts. In both situations there is no threat of
coercion or unreliability). Furthermore, the fact that neither accuracy nor the integrity of the
factfinding process would be threatened by the reliable and probative evidence being suppressed in
Massiah contexts leads proponents to conclude that suppression cannot possibly be a part of a de-
fendant's right to a fair trial. See Moulton, 474 U.S. at 191 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (because of the
trustworthy nature of the evidence, its admission will not imperil "'the fairness of a trial or... the
integrity of the factfinding process'" (quoting Williams, 430 U.S. at 414 (Powell, J., concurring));
Williams, 430 U.S. at 437 (White, J., dissenting) (officers did not "jeopardize the fairness of respon-
dent's trial or in any way risk the conviction of an innocent man-the risk against which the Sixth
Amendment guarantee of assistance of counsel is designed to protect").
Both of these conclusions are faulty. First, there is no logical reason that the rationale for sixth
amendment suppression should be dictated by the alleged similarity of fourth, fifth, and sixth amend-
ment "exclusionary consequences." The "exclusionary consequence" of the right to counsel at trial
is often the loss of uncoerced, reliable, probative evidence. That similarity to the consequences of
fourth amendment and Miranda exclusion, however, does not diminish the stature or content of trial
counsel. It should have no greater impact upon the pretrial extension of that same right. As the
textual discussion suggests, in deciding whether any variety of exclusion is a present right or a pre-
ventive, future-oriented sanction, the determinative factor must be whether the admission of the
evidence will damage interests protected by the constitutional provision involved. In the Massiah
situation, the admission of elicited uncounseled statements does harm to values protected by the
sixth amendment trial grant of adversarial equalization.
Second, the right to a fair trial and the right to an accurate determination of guilt or innocence
are neither coextensive nor synonymous. See Tomkovicz, supra note 8, at 39-62. The right to a fair
trial encompasses both accuracy and the entitlement to fair play according to established rules and
procedures. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 523-24 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (punishment
of the guilty is not the highest value in our society; the Constitution's guarantees serve not only the
"functional purposes" of ensuring "that the 'guilty' are punished and the 'innocent' freed," they have
"independent vitality and value"). Part of the right to a fair trial in our adversary system is an
entitlement to an equalizing advocate who advances the defendant's cause and impedes state efforts
to convict. See Tomkovicz, supra note 8, at 40, 49-51. Trial counsel is not restricted to performing
functions that prevent coercive treatment or promote truthful outcomes. As defendant's partisan,
counsel frequently impedes the search for truth, sometimes by preventing uncoerced, reliable, and
probative evidence from reaching the trier. Id. at 40-55; see also Stone, 428 U.S. at 523 n. 16 (Bren.
nan, J., dissenting) ("[E]very constitutional guarantee governing administration of the criminal jus-
tice system" can be accused of diverting the attention of the court from the determination of truth
and of freeing the guilty.). A right to pretrial counsel designed to preserve the efficacy of the trial
guarantee can be expected to have and should have, the same sorts of impacts on the trial process.
The fact that Massiah doctrine excludes uncoerced, reliable, and probative evidence should not
lead us to conclude that sixth amendment exclusion is merely a remedy, and not a constitutional
right. Cf. Stone, 428 U.S. at 524 (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("Particular constitutional rights that do
not affect the fairness of factfinding procedures cannot for that reason be denied at the trial itself.").
If anything, that fact provides assurance that counsel's role is being preserved, that the harms coun-
sel is empowered to shield an accused against are being avoided, and that the interests furthered by a
right to counsel are being safeguarded.
114. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
115. The structure and language of Supreme Court opinions can support this dual-natured view
of Massiah suppression. See Nix, 467 U.S. 431, 444-47 (entertaining and responding to both deter-
rent and fair trial rationales for exclusion); Moulton, 474 U.S. at 170-74, 176 (suggesting that pretrial
elicitation of incriminating information itself violates the sixth amendment right); see also Comment,
supra note 74, at 384-85 (suggesting that a constitutional violation is effected by the uncounseled
pretrial encounter, although it is of no consequence to an accused unless the products are used to his
prejudice at trial); id. at 385-86 & n.296 (Massiah can be interpreted as holding that a sixth amend-
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tive, however, presumes the existence of constitutionally injurious out-of-court
conduct, and the pretrial activities regulated by Massiah doctrine do not effect a
complete sixth amendment violation. 116 Uncounseled official elicitation is a part
of the governmental action prohibited by adversary system principles, but only a
part. Without use of the uncounseled disclosures in the criminal process, there is
no cognizable harm to constitutional interests in adversarial fair play. 1t 7 The
accused suffers no real deprivation of the substantive benefits of equalization if
his defense is not damaged.1 18 Consequently, the suppression of Massiah-viola-
tive disclosures is not necessary to deter extrajudicial violations of constitutional
rights.' 19 Exclusion under Massiah is a personal right, neither more nor less
ment violation occurs only when disclosures are admitted at trial, but such an interpretation is
neither logical nor accurate; deterrence of improper, unconstitutional conduct is also one of the
Massiah exclusionary rule's purposes).
116. The Supreme Court's descriptions of the pretrial uncounseled elicitations governed by Mas-
siah doctrine as violations of the sixth amendment right to counsel would support a contrary posi-
tion. See, e.g., Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S. 436, 459 (1986) (suggesting that a defendent makes
out a "violation" of the right to counsel by showing "that the police and their informant took some
action... designed deliberately to elicit incriminating remarks"); Moulton, 474 U.S. at 176 (noting
that "the Sixth Amendment is violated when the State obtains incriminating statements by know-
ingly circumventing the accused's right to have counsel present"); Henry, 447 U.S. at 274 (Court
found Henry's sixth amendment right violated when government "intentionally creat[ed] a situation
likely to induce Henry to make incriminating statements without the assistance of counsel"). Still,
such statements would seem to be in direct conflict with the Court's acceptance of the legitimacy,
indeed the desirability, of continuing investigations of separate crimes even though those investiga-
tions may well involve deliberate elicitations concerning charged crimes. See Moulton, 474 U.S. at
180 & n.16 (state does not violate a defendant's right to counsel by obtaining incriminating state-
ments pertaining to a separate, uncharged crime and using those statements at the trial of that
crime); Massiah, 377 U.S. at 207 (noting that "it was entirely proper to continue an investigation of
the suspected criminal activities of the defendant ... even though the defendant had already been
indicted"). If the Court really believed that pretrial elicitations were themselves constitutionally
injurious, it certainly would not approve of their use to uncover continuing criminality by accused
individuals. The most plausible explanation of the Court's apparent self-contradiction is that it has
been guilty of imprecise usage in describing pretrial elicitations as deprivations of constitutional
rights.
117. See Wasserstrom & Mertens, supra note 9, at 175 (deliberate elicitation of statements "con-
ceivably violates no rights at all" if subsequent use of those statements is not contemplated).
118. See Wasserstrom & Mertens, supra note 9, at 177 (if prosecution has secured no "litigative
advantage" from its deliberate elicitation, "it is difficult to see how the judicial proceeding has been
tainted").
The contrary argument is that there is a "process" right to the assistance of counsel in the
pretrial Massiah setting. The right to counsel's assistance at trial consists not only of the substantive
benefits counsel provides, but also of a "process" component. Part of the enjoyment of the in-court
right lies in the receipt of counsel's assistance and the psychological benefits of receiving that assist-
ance. If that "process" component does extend to pretrial settings and is a substantial enough con-
stitutional interest to merit protection, then there would be an out-of-court violation of the sixth
amendment at the time of elicitation governed by Massiah. The position taken in the text is based on
the premise that the sixth amendment "process" entitlement need not be extended outside the court-
room setting. Unlike the substantive benefits of the trial right, it can be confined to the courtroom
context without cognizable harm to sixth amendment values.
119. See Schulhofer, supra note 101, at 889 (Massiah exclusionary rule not intended to deter any
pretrial behavior whatsoever, but, rather, explicitly permits government efforts to elicit as long as
products are not used against defendant at his trial).
The exclusion of evidence is not the only legal option for a person who has suffered a constitu-
tional deprivation. The aggrieved might also seek compensatory damages for the harm to his or her
constitutional entitlement. See, e.g., Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335, 345-46 (1986) (discussing quali-
fied immunity of officer relying upon search warrant in suit for damages for unreasonable search);
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 397 (1971)
(holding that claim against federal agent for damages for alleged illegal arrest and search stated "a
1989]
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than an essential element of the constitutional entitlement to counsel. 120
cause of action under the Fourth Amendment"). One consequence of the position that no complete
violation of the sixth amendment is accomplished in pretrial Massiah contexts is that an accused
cannot sue for damages for a deprivation of rights based on an uncounseled deliberate elicitation
alone. No compensable constitutional wrong would occur until the state uses disclosures in court.
It is important to determine whether deterrence of uncounseled pretrial elicitations is merely an
inevitable consequence of right-based sixth amendment exclusion or a secondary reason for such
exclusion. If the enforcement of present rights is the only rationale for exclusion, then suppression is
not called for in any situation where present rights would not be violated by admission. Such is the
case, for example, when disclosures elicited from an accused are later used to prove crimes un-
charged at the time of the elicitation. See Tomkovicz, supra note 8, at 83-90. On the other hand, if
the prevention of pretrial elicitations is an objective of exclusion, suppression might be justified even
in cases where present rights are not offended by admission. For example, in situations where the
government seeks to introduce disclosures at the trial of an uncharged crime, a deterrent rationale
might well call for suppression in order to remove a substantial incentive for improper and undesir-
able future elicitations. The costs to law enforcement interests-lost arrests and convictions-would
increase from such pursuit of a secondary deterrent rationale.
The point is that there would be significant theoretical, doctrinal, and practical consequences of
a determination that sixth amendment exclusion is not only a right, but also a deterrent sanction.
120. Perhaps there are other reasons to seek deterrence. Pretrial acquisition and possession of a
defendant's revelations might give the government adversarial advantages other than the obvious
gains implicit in evidentiary use of that information and its clear fruits. Those revelations might
contribute to the generation of other proof in imperceptible, undiscoverable ways. They might intan-
gibly bolster the prosecution's case for and commitment to conviction. In other words, even if the
disclosures themselves are suppressed, the state adversary might still profit from a pretrial encounter
with an unprotected adversary. If that is the case, Massiah-bascd exclusion might seek to deter
elicitations in order to eliminate the risks of such profit and the resultant harms to adversary system
values. Sixth amendment values may not be adequately protected by the exclusion of the uncoun-
seled disclosures and their fruits from trials.
Another reason that deterrence might be desirable is the appearance of unfair play engendered
by permitting the government to conduct uncounseled elicitations and gain access to its adversary's
thoughts. Massiah-based suppression might seek to eliminate that appearance by discouraging the
uncounseled elicitations that are its source. Cf Wheat v. United States, 108 S. Ct. 1692, 1697 (1988)
("Federal courts have an independent interest in ensuring that criminal trials are conducted within
the ethical standards of the profession and that legal proceedings appear fair to all who observe
them."); Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954) ("[Jjustice must satisfy the appearance of
justice.").
Although such arguments have merit, they are inadequate to support a secondary deterrent
rationale for sixth amendment exclusion. The clear message of a deterrent rationale in the Massiah
realm would be that the state should not deliberately or knowingly elicit disclosures pertinent to a
charged offense. Because of the impact of a deterrent message on interests in continuing investiga-
tions, its delivery would be illogical unless the constitutional values threatened by Massiah-regulated
conduct were considered more significant than society's interests in continuing investigations. The
determination that we should seek to discourage pretrial elicitations by means of Massiah-based
exclusion would have to be based on the premise that the risks to constitutional values posed by such
elicitations outweigh the state investigatory interests promoted by such elicitations. Cf. Maine v.
Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 180 (1985) (observing that in cases in which one offense is the subject of a
formal charge a sixth amendment restraint upon the government's efforts to obtain incriminating
statements pertinent to separate, uncharged offenses "would unnecessarily frustrate the public's in-
terest in the investigation of criminal activities"); Massiah, 377 U.S. at 207 (observing that "in this
case, as in many cases, it was entirely proper to continue an investigation of the suspected criminal
activities of the defendant ... even though the defendant had already been indicted"). The specula-
tive risks to rights and appearances of unfairness on which the deterrent arguments described above
rest seem too insubstantial to counterbalance the potential concrete harms to society's interests in
investigating ongoing and future criminality.
When the admission of evidence involves actual harm to constitutional interests, it is inappro-
priate to balance societal costs against constitutional gains. We must accept the Framers' balance of
interests mandating exclusion. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479 (the "recurrent argument . . . that
society's need for interrogation outweighs the privilege" against compulsory self-incrimination is
answered by the constitutional prescription "in the Fifth Amendment that an individual cannot be
compelled to be a witness against himself. That right cannot be abridged [in order to further law
enforcement ends]."); see also United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 929-30 (1984) (Brennan, J.,
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IV. EXCLUSIONARY ISSUES: DOCTRINAL IMPLICATIONS OF A SIXTH
AMENDMENT RIGHT TO EXCLUSION
Over the past two decades, the Supreme Court has dramatically qualified
the scope of the fourth amendment and Miranda exclusionary rules. 12 1 The
cumulative impact of the current limitations on suppression is quite substan-
tial.122 In the fourth amendment arena, the Court has developed a "standing"
restriction, 12 3 an "independent source" exception,1 24 an "attenuation" excep-
tion, 125 a limited "good faith" exception, 126 and a strong presumption against
exclusion in federal habeas corpus proceedings. 12 7 In the Miranda context, the
Court has endorsed a limited "presumptive attenuation" principle, and has
hinted that derivative fruits might be immune from exclusion.12 8 In both do-
dissenting) (because fourth amendment exclusion is a constitutional right, balancing of law enforce-
ment costs against deterrent gains is unacceptable). It is perfectly appropriate, however, to consider
the law enforcement costs generated by exclusion in cases in which present rights are not harmed
and the targets of deterrence are only "risks" of constitutional damage and "appearances" of injus-
tice. In those cases, the undesirable governmental conduct that results from the failure to seek
maximum deterrence creates only a possibility of ultimate constitutional damage. See New York v.
Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654, 657 (1984) (endorsing public safety exception to Miranda warnings
requirement because absence of warnings generates only a risk, and therefore ordinarily a "presump-
tion," of compulsion, but not the "actual" compulsion that would offend fifth amendment
principles).
121. For decisions qualifying the fourth amendment exclusionary rule, see, eg., Massachusetts v.
Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984); Rawlings v. Kentucky,
448 U.S. 98 (1980); United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128
(1978). For decisions restricting the Miranda rule of exclusion, see, e.g., Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S.
298 (1985); Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
122. When the developments of the last twenty years are added together, then added to previ-
ously developed restrictions on the suppression of unconstitutionally obtained evidence, see, e.g.,
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S.
385 (1920), the total diminishment of opportunities for constitutionally based exclusion is
substantial.
123. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); Alder-
man v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
124. See Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 796 (1984); Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States,
251 U.S. 385 (1920).
125. See United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268 (1978); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S. 590 (1975);
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963).
126. See Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981 (1984); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897
(1984).
127. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
128. See Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985). The "presumptive attenuation" language is my
characterization of the holding of Elstad. I believe it to be an accurate characterization of the
Court's conclusion that the mere failure to issue Miranda admonitions taints only the statements
secured as an immediate result, and, absent actual compulsion or abusive governmental behavior,
does not taint or affect the admissibility of any subsequent statement secured following proper Mi-
randa compliance. See id. at 306 (a "procedural Miranda violation differs in significant respects
from" a fourth amendment violation, and therefore ought to have narrower exclusionary conse-
quences); id. at 313-14 (declaring the "causal connection" between the admission secured in viola-
tion of Miranda and the "ultimate decision to cooperate" by giving a second statement following
Miranda compliance "speculative and attenuated at best"). It is true and important that the Court's
actual holding in Elstad encompasses only second confessions given after officials have satisfied Mi-
randa. The Elstad majority did not hold that all derivative products of unwarned statements are
presumptively attenuated and, therefore, admissible. Still the Court provided sufficient dicta to point
toward the latter conclusion, a conclusion that could effectively gut the "fruit of the poisonous tree"
doctrine in Miranda contexts. See id. at 346-47 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that the "Court
[did] not limit its analysis to successive confessions, but recurrently refer[red] generally to the 'fruits'
of the illegal confession" and that the "potential impact of the Court's reasoning might ... include
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mains, the products of improper conduct may be used to impeach testifying
defendants. 129
All such qualifications and limitations have been derived from the deterrent
premises of fourth amendment and Miranda suppression. All require fresh eval-
uation, analysis, and resolution in the sixth amendment context, where exclusion
is not a deterrent sanction, but a constitutional right.
A. Standing to Raise a Sixth Amendment Claim
A defendant may not raise a fourth amendment claim as a basis for exclu-
sion of evidence unless he was the victim of the contested search or seizure. He
must have suffered a cognizable invasion of privacy, property, or liberty.1 30 The
proffered rationales for the "standing" limitation are: (1) that fourth amend-
ment rights "are personal rights" that "may not be vicariously asserted"; (2)
that sufficient deterrence flows from suppression at the behest of the victim; and
(3) that any incremental deterrence from the suppression of illegally acquired
evidence in a nonvictim's case would be too costly to the administration of crim-
inal justice. 131
The question here is whether, in light of the dramatically different character
of sixth amendment exclusion, a similar "standing" limitation should apply.
The answer is that the right-based nature of Massiah exclusion provides an even
stronger basis for a "standing"-type limitation. 1 32
the discovery of physical evidence and other derivative fruits of Miranda violations as well") (cita-
tions and footnote omitted); State v. Wethered, 110 Wash. 2d 466, 474, 755 P.2d 797, 801-02 (1988)
(Elstad dictum "strongly suggests" that a Miranda violation alone will not taint any kind of deriva-
tive evidence, therefore, "hashish derived from [a] non-Mirandized testimonial act needs not be
suppressed").
129. See United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975);
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
130. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980) (to object to illegal search of purse
defendant must have had his "legitimate expectation of privacy" violated by the search); Rakas v.
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 140 (1978) (for a defendant to be entitled to challenge a search or seizure, "the
disputed search and seizure has [to have] infringed an interest" protected by the fourth amend-
ment--"a legitimate expectation of privacy"); id. at 159, 160 n.5 (White, J., dissenting) (suggesting
that because the fourth amendment "protects one's liberty and property interests against unreasona-
ble seizures of self and effects," a defendant has standing to object to the unreasonable seizure of his
own person or his property whether or not he suffers a privacy deprivation).
131. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174-75 (1969).
[W]e are not convinced that the additional benefits of extending the exclusionary rule to
other defendants [whose fourth amendment rights have not been violated] would justify
further encroachment upon the public interest in prosecuting those accused of crime and
having them acquitted or convicted on the basis of all the evidence which exposes the truth.
Id. The Supreme Court has not addressed the standing issue in the Miranda area. When that issue
arises, the Court will undoubtedly conclude, as lower courts have concluded, that its fourth amend-
ment reasoning is equally relevant to the essentially deterrent-grounded domain of Miranda exclu-
sion. See, e.g., United States v. Salinas-Calderon, 728 F.2d 1298, 1302 (10th Cir. 1984); United
States v. Fredericks, 586 F.2d 470, 480 (5th Cir. 1978).
132. The language of the original Massiah opinion provides strong evidence that the Court con-
templated such a standing limitation. See Massiah, 377 U.S. at 207 ("All that we hold is that the
defendant's own incriminating statements... could not constitutionally be used by the prosecution
as evidence against him at his trial.") (emphasis in original); see also United States v. Shapiro, 669
F.2d 593, 598 (9th Cir. 1982) (right to counsel extended by Massiah doctrine "may not be asserted
by a third person"); United States v. Partin, 601 F.2d 1000, 1006 (9th Cir. 1979) (sixth amendment
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No violation of the sixth amendment occurs until the fruits of uncounseled
elicitation are used in court. When a defendant is deprived of pretrial counsel,
and her disclosures are then used to convict her, she sustains the concrete harm
that adversarial equalization is designed to prevent. That harm consists of two
essential components-a denial of assistance in a critical confrontation with the
state and resultant damage to the trial defense. If either is lacking, there is no
completed violation of the right to counsel. 133
It follows that when a defendant seeks to suppress the products of an en-
counter in which another has been deprived of equalizing pretrial assistance, the
defendant cannot establish a constitutional violation. Harm to sixth amendment
interests occurs only when the trial defense of one who has been deprived of
counsel's guidance is damaged as a result of that deprivation. An accused can-
not demonstrate that kind of harm by establishing that disclosures to be used
against her are the product of uncounseled pretrial elicitation from another ac-
cused. 134 Consequently, one defendant should not be entitled to exclude evi-
dence from his trial because it was secured by failing to respect another
defendant's Massiah entitlement. Whether the deficiency is characterized as a
lack of standing, or as a failure to demonstrate a sixth amendment violation,1 35
such a claim should be rejected.1 36
right to counsel "is a personal right and its violation . . . does not give [a third party] standing to
challenge his conviction") (citation omitted).
133. For the reasoning behind these conclusions, see supra text accompanying notes 95-101.
134. In addition, the individual who has been denied assistance in the Massiah encounter is not
harmed when his disclosures are used at another's trial. Consequently, he too is unable to prove a
completed violation of the sixth amendment right.
Even if the pretrial denial of assistance did constitute a completed constitutional violation, a
position I have rejected, see supra text accompanying notes 114-19, an accused would lack standing
to assert the violation of rights of third party who was injured by the uncounseled pretrial encounter.
See L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 134-45 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing the "prudential"
rule against "third-party standing,"-the general requirement that a litigant assert her own legal
rights and interests, and not rest her claim on the legal rights or interests of others). Of course, if a
reason for sixth amendment exclusion was to deter such pretrial encounters, it would be arguable
that the defendant should be allowed to claim suppression in order to promote (or in order not to
undermine) the deterrent objective. An analogous fourth amendment argument has been rejected by
the Court on the basis of cost-benefit interest balancing. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S.
165, 174-75 (1969) (recognition of "deterrent aim" of fourth amendment exclusionary rule did not
eliminate standing requirement because costs of exclusion must be weighed against deterrent gains,
and "additional benefits" of allowing those not harmed by search to exclude evidence do not justify
the resultant "encroachment upon the public interest" in convicting criminals).
135. Because no one has suffered a completed deprivation of rights, it seems inaccurate to de-
scribe the deficiency as a lack of standing to assert the violation of another's rights. The true charac-
ter of the deficiency is an inability to establish a sixth amendment violation.
136. The reasoning and result in the due process-coerced confession area should be different. In
coerced confession situations there is a substantial constitutional claim that it is unfair to proceed
against one with fruits compelled from another. See United States v. Fredericks, 586 F.2d 470, 481
(5th Cir. 1978) (prosecution could not use statements "wrung from one... suspectf through torture
and unremittting prolonged interrogation in the trial of" another suspect). But see United States v.
Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 737 n.9 (1980) (even if purposeful violation of one individual's privacy in
order to discover information for use against other persons constituted outrageous conduct in viola-
tion of due process principles, because person against whom the information was used was not the
victim of the outrageous search he lacked standing to raise a due process claim). An analogous
claim in the Massiah area would require too expansive a view of adversarial system fair play. The
right to counsel ensures that the state will not convict an accused by dealing with him as an inferior.
To allow one defendant to raise a pretrial counsel deprivation suffered by a third party would require
acceptance of the premise that our adversary system considers it unfair for the government to use the
1989]
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B. The Sixth Amendment Independent Source and Inevitable Discovery
Exceptions
The independent source exception to the exclusionary rule holds that if evi-
dence has been acquired by illegal means, but that same evidence has also been
obtained by wholly legitimate, independent methods, the government may use
the legally discovered evidence. 137 The theory beneath this fourth amendment
"exception"' 138 to exclusion, which originated prior to the modem era of cost-
benefit deterrent balancing,139 has not been developed at length. 140 Still, it
seems completely compatible with modem deterrent reasoning. Under the cur-
rent premises of fourth amendment exclusion, the suppression of independently
acquired evidence would be illogical, inconsistent with the rationale for suppres-
sion, and unacceptably costly in light of any deterrent gain. t41
The inevitable discovery exception holds that evidence that was in fact ob-
products of imbalanced encounters with anyone to convict those who themselves received the full
assistance of counsel in all dealings with the state. My broad view of adversary system premises does
not extend quite that far.
137. See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). Although the in-
dependent source exception has not been applied by the Court to a Miranda violation, because of the
similarity of fourth amendment and Miranda exclusionary rationales, it is undoubtedly equally ap-
plicable, though possibly less likely to be provable, in the Miranda context.
138. Actually, the independent source doctrine is not an "exception" to the exclusionary rule.
That terminology seems appropriate for situations in which evidence to be admitted has in fact been
illegally acquired but is nonetheless admissible. In those situations, an exception is made to the
presumptive rule of exclusion generally applicable to evidence derived from impropriety. The in-
dependent source doctrine, on the other hand, is applicable in situations in which no causal connec-
tion links a governmental illegality and the acquisition of the contested evidence. See Segura v.
United States, 468 U.S. 796, 815 (1984) (supporting application of independent source doctrine with
observation that evidence is not excludable unless there is at least a "but for" causal link between its
discovery and the official illegality); Hamilton v. Nix, 809 F.2d 463, 465 (8th Cir. 1987) (in cases
involving independent sources, "there is no reason to exclude the challenged evidence since the
police misconduct is not even a 'but for' cause of its discovery."). Because the evidence at issue is
not the result of illegal conduct, there is no need in the independent source situation for an "excep-
tion" to the presumptive rule of exclusion covering derivative products. Still, the convention has
been to refer to the doctrine as an "exception" to the exclusionary rule. See Segura, 468 U.S. at 806
(referring to " 'independent source' exception").
139. See Wasserstrom & Mertens, supra note 9, at 157 (independent source exception was not
originally based on deterrent reasoning).
140. The belated reconciliation of the independent source doctrine and modern deterrent theory
in Nix, 467 U.S. at 443-44, at least partially remedied the deficiency in the underlying theory of the
doctrine. Nix itself did not involve an independent source. The Court explained the doctrine
therein, however, to provide a predicate for the inevitable discovery exception that was involved. Its
rationalization of the independent source doctrine is helpful, though not wholly satisfactory.
141. The suppression of independently derived evidence would undoubtedly have some deterrent
impact. The loss of legitimately acquired evidence would generate a real disincentive for future
investigatory misconduct like that which preceded the legal discovery of the evidence suppressed. It
would add force to the sanction imposed by suppressing the illegally acquired version of the evi-
dence. Nonetheless, it would do so in an arguably illogical, punitive, and disproportionate way.
Suppression would be arguably illogical because the evidence acquired independently is in fact not
connected to the illegality. See Hamilton v. Nix, 809 F.2d 463, 468 (8th Cir. 1987) ("[lt would be
an ironic rule of law to exclude a critical witness's testimony . . . simply because the police had
unlawfully obtained some of the same information during the course of their investigation."). Sup-
pression would deprive the state of the fruits of proper behavior, not the products of-thus "incen-
tives" for future-illegalities. In addition, suppression would be premised on a punitive rationale,
that is, on the creation of a disincentive or the imposition of a penalty, rather than on the removal of
profit. That rationale conflicts with accepted deterrent theory. See infra notes 146-47 and accompa-
nying text. Moreover, insofar as it at least doubles the price of the impropriety, the resulting sanc-
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tained improperly is admissible, if it would have been inevitably acquired by legal
means. 142 The doctrine has been rooted primarily in deterrent reasoning identi-
cal to that justifying the independent source exception. 14 3 According to that
reasoning, the government does not "profit" from its wrong when allowed to use
the illegally secured evidence because it has not acquired anything by its im-
proper conduct that it would not have acquired without that conduct. Exclu-
sion, therefore, can remove no "incentive" for future illegality. 14 4 Exclusion
would put the government in a "worse" evidentiary position than it would have
been in had it not behaved illegally. 145 The deterrent logic beneath the exclu-
sionary rule has traditionally called for the removal of profit incentives, 14 6 but
has rejected the imposition of penalties.147 Suppression of evidence that would
have been discovered and used without the impropriety would penalize the state
and clash with that logic. 148
The Court has also deemed the inevitable discovery exception wholly con-
sistent with the theory that exclusion on behalf of a defendant who has suffered a
tion might well be considered disproportionate to the governmental wrong and unacceptably costly
to society.
The reasoning here is similar to that which, in my view, underlies the conclusion that an im-
proper arrest does not pose a bar to trial or conviction. See Frisbie v. Collins, 342 U.S. 519, 522
(1952) (reaffirming the holding that even flagrantly illegal methods of securing a defendant's pres-
ence for trial do not bar the trial or void the conviction). Prohibiting trial of the illegally arrested
would undoubtedly deter such arrests. Such deterrence, however, seems to be punitive and an exces-
sively costly way of achieving constitutional ends.
142. The Supreme Court has specifically endorsed the inevitable discovery exception only in the
Massiah context. See Nix, 467 U.S. 431. The doctrine is closely related, but not identical, to the
independent source doctrine. See id. at-443; id. at 458 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The clear difference
between the inevitable discovery exception and the independent source doctrine is that the evidence
to be admitted actually was secured illegally; the legal method of acquisition in the inevitable discov-
ery case is "hypothetical," not actual. Id. at 443; id. at 459 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The Supreme Court has not applied the independent source doctrine in a sixth amendment case.
For cases illustrating the operation of the independent source doctrine in Massiah situations, see
Hamilton v. Nix, 809 F.2d 463 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v. Massey, 437 F. Supp. 843 (M.D.
Fla. 1977).
143. Nix, 467 U.S. at 443-46.
144. This reasoning is the Court's. It ignores potentially significant nonevidentiary advantages
and profits involved in inevitable discovery contexts. See infra note 163.
145. See Nix, 467 U.S. at 444 ("exclusion of evidence that would inevitably have been discovered
would ... put the government in a worse position" than if there had been no "error or violation").
146. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
147. See Nix, 467 U.S. at 445 (Court's prior holdings do not support the "formalistic, pointless,
and punitive approach" involved in putting the government in a worse position than it would have
been in had it not acted illegally).
148. These main premises of Nix clearly are transferable to the fourth amendment and Miranda
exclusion contexts. When the time comes, the Court almost certainly will find them applicable in
those contexts. See United States v. Whitehorn, 829 F.2d 1225 (2d Cir. 1987); United States v.
Hernandez-Cano, 808 F.2d 779 (11th Cir. 1987); United States v. Andrade, 784 F.2d 1431 (9th Cir.
1986). But see People v. Stith, 69 N.Y.2d 313, 506 N.E.2d 911, 514 N.Y.S.2d 201 (N.Y. 1987).
However, at least in those fourth amendment situations involving the claim that evidence searched
for and seized in violation of the warrant requirement should be admitted because it inevitably would
have been discovered during the execution of the warrant that could have been obtained, the applica-
tion of inevitable discovery should be approached with extreme caution. Acceptance of the inevita-
ble discovery reasoning in such situations could eviscerate the rule that "warrantless seizures are per
se unreasonable." See People v. Schoondermark, 717 P.2d 504 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985).
For arguments that the inevitable discovery exception is not wholly consistent with deterrent
policies, see Wasserstrom & Mertens, supra note 9, at 160-75.
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pretrial Massiah deprivation is necessary to protect the integrity and fairness of
adversary system factfinding processes. 149 According to that analysis, if the
government would have had the products of a pretrial denial of counsel for trial
use in any event, then it acquires no adversarial advantage when allowed to use
those products. 150 The trial is no different-therefore, no more or less fair-
than if pretrial counsel had been afforded. Moreover, when the disputed prod-
uct is undeniably reliable and probative physical evidence, truth is not jeopard-
ized by its use. In that situation, the adversary system's interest in accurate
determinations of guilt and innocence-the motivation for granting counsel' I -"
cannot be threatened. According to the Court, because it does not alter the
course of the trial or inject any risk of inaccuracy, the use of reliable evidence
that was secured without counsel's protection, but would have been secured any-
way, threatens no adversary system values.' 52
The admission at trial of evidence that actually was acquired by independ-
ent legal means does not infringe upon the constitutional right to equalization.
The primary reason for Massiah exclusion is to prevent the prejudice to the de-
fense generated by imbalanced pretrial dealings.' 53 In the case of a truly in-
dependent source, because the state does not use the actual products of an
adversarial imbalance the accused suffers no harm that the sixth amendment
was intended to prevent. Therefore, the independent source doctrine is wholly
compatible with a right-based theory of Massiah exclusion. 54
The admission of evidence that actually was acquired improperly but that
would have been inevitably acquired by legitimate means raises a somewhat dif-
ferent question and requires different analysis. In that situation, the government
does use the actual products of pretrial adversarial imbalance against the ac-
cused. The entire course of government conduct proscribed by the sixth amend-
ment does in fact occur. The state secures damaging evidence by not respecting
the entitlement to equalization and uses that evidence to prosecute. The prob-
lem, however, is that the entire course of unconstitutional official conduct does
149. See Nix, 467 U.S. at 446-48. In fact, the Court concluded that suppression of evidence that
would have been inevitably discovered would "undermine the adversary system by putting the state
in a worse position than it would have occupied without any police misconduct." Id. at 447 (empha-
sis in original).
150. Id. at 447 (adversary system fairness safeguarded and assured if state and accused placed in
the same positions they would have been in if no counsel denial had transpired).
151. Id. at 446-47. "The Sixth Amendment right to counsel protects against unfairness by pre-
serving the adversary process in which the reliability of proffered evidence may be tested in cross-
examination. Suppression in ... circumstances [involving indisputably reliable evidence] would do
nothing to promote the integrity of the trial process." Id.
152. The Court has a real affinity for the interest in reliable, accurate guilt-innocence determina-
tions, an affinity that frequently leads it to underestimate the value and significance of the right to
counsel. In its inevitable discovery discussion, the Court's reliance on the reliability factor does not
diminish the constitutional right to counsel. Such relevance is, however, quite unnecessary. If the
identical evidence would have appeared at trial whether or not counsel was afforded at the pretrial
encounter, admission of that evidence does no damage to any interest that counsel is meant to pro-
tect, or could have protected, no matter how unreliable that evidence might be.
153. See supra notes 95-101 and accompanying text.
154. The textual conclusions concerning the independent source doctrine are analytically similar
to the Nix Court's responses to Williams' contention that inevitable discovery is irreconcilable with
the right-based character of Massiah exclusion. See supra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
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not harm or prejudice the defendant in any way that he would not have been
harmed or prejudiced had the conduct not transpired. Because the same evi-
dence would have been inevitably discovered and used, the government's uncon-
stitutional behavior is essentially harmless to the accused's ultimate sixth
amendment interests.15 5 Consequently, an inevitable discovery exception can be
compatible with a right-based theory of Massiah exclusion. It is not constitu-
tionally acceptable because the actions offensive to sixth amendment values have
not come to pass. Rather, it is palatable because even though constitutionally
objectionable actions have occurred, those actions have not injured the defend-
ant at trial.156
Despite the Supreme Court's contrary conclusions, deterrence might be an
appropriate objective of suppression in independent source and inevitable dis-
covery contexts. In both situations, even though the use of the contested evi-
dence itself at trial confers no constitutionally offensive advantage on the
government, the uncounseled elicitation of disclosures could yield other benefits
that imperil adversary system values. In both situations the state might exploit
the improperly acquired information to secure intangible or undiscernable evi-
dentiary or strategic gains that it would not otherwise have had.157 Moreover,
155. The government gains no advantage and the accused is not prejudiced by the admission of
the products of the pretrial counsel deprivation if the process and outcome of the trial are the same as
they would have been without the deprivation. As observed earlier, for similar reasons the Supreme
Court concluded in Nix that the admission of evidence that would have been discovered does not
endanger the fairness ensured by the sixth amendment. See Nix, 467 U.S. at 447; see also id. at 456
(Stevens, J., concurring) (if trial not tainted by pretrial misconduct, defendant receives the "type of
trial the Sixth Amendment envisions"); Wasserstrom & Mertens, supra note 9, at 177 (in inevitable
discovery situations state gains no "litigative advantage"; without such advantage it is hard to see
how trial is tainted).
Although the conclusions reached in the present discussion are basically consistent with the
Court's conclusions, the reasoning is somewhat different. The Nix Court did not state that in inevi-
table discovery cases the official conduct violates sixth amendment commands but is acceptable
nonetheless because it is "harmless." This analytical difference between my reasoning and the
Court's leads to a significantly different conclusion regarding the appropriate burden of proof. See
infra note 156.
156. The Court has applied the harmless error doctrine to Massiah claims. See Milton v. Wain-
wright, 407 U.S. 371, 378 (1972). Although the reasoning here is not identical to that underlying the
typical harmless error situation, it is analytically similar. In the ordinary harmless error case, an
acknowledged constitutional transgression does not result in reversal of a conviction because its
contribution to the trial was too insubstantial, in light of other evidence, to have affected the out-
come. In the case of Massiah-violative evidence that would have been inevitably discovered, the
constitutional wrong should not lead to exclusion because its evidentiary contribution to the case is
identical to evidence that would have appeared at trial by legal means.
The Nix Court concluded that the burden on the government is to establish inevitable discovery
by a preponderance of the evidence. The traditional harmless error standard holds that a constitu-
tional error must be "harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." See Chapman v. California, 386 U.S.
18, 24 (1967). The Chapman Court's high standard of harmlessness, designed to ensure that consti-
tutional rights and interests are not compromised, suggests that the preponderance standard in Nix
is unacceptably low. To ensure that the conduct prohibited by Massiah doctrine does not inflict the
very harm meant to be prevented by the sixth amendment, the burden should be comparable to that
imposed by the Chapman harmless error standard. See Nix, 467 U.S. at 459 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) (contending that government should shoulder the burden of proving inevitable discovery by
"clear and convincing evidence").
157. In the independent source situation, the possible exploitation with which we should be con-
cerned would have to occur prior to the actual legitimate discovery. In the inevitable discovery case,
the possible exploitation with which we should be concerned would have to occur prior to the hypo-
thetical legitimate discovery, a point more difficult to determine.
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in the inevitable discovery situation, the illegal acquisition might enable the state
to be a more effective adversary by saving time, money, or energy that it would
otherwise have had to expend.1 58 Insofar as any such gains contribute to an
accused's conviction, there would be damage to the substantive protection af-
forded by sixth amendment equalization. Suppression of the evidence that was
or would have been discovered legally would be a means of deterring the counsel
deprivations that led to that constitutional damage.159
We should not ignore such advantages simply because they are less concrete
or obvious than those gained by placing the improperly secured evidence before
the trier.'6 0 Nevertheless, unless such intangible gains are real and substan-
tial, 16' we should probably not base a potentially costly deterrent policy on
them. Before putting the state in a considerably and tangibly worse evidentiary
position than it would have occupied had it acted properly, we ought to be confi-
dent that the threats to sixth amendment interests are cognizable. 162 Therefore,
in the absence of a demonstrated need to prevent the state from reaping unac-
ceptable benefits from pretrial denials of counsel, evidence that fits within the
independent source or inevitable discovery exceptions should be admissible. 1
63
158. This is not the case in independent source settings. By definition, the government has spent
the resources necessary for legal acquisition in those cases.
159. Concededly, the suppression of that evidence might be inconsistent with the Court's insis-
tence that exclusion only be used to remove profits of illegalities, not to impose punitive sanctions
upon officials. Nevertheless, if deterrence were deemed desirable such suppression might be the only
effective way of achieving it. It might well be impossible to discern, isolate, or remove the actual
adversarial profits acquired from exploitation of the illegalities in independent source and inevitable
discovery situations. If so, the only way to ensure that the government does not reap those unconsti-
tutional profits in future cases might be to discourage the elicitations that yield them by excluding
the evidence that was or would have been discovered.
160. The textual discussion assumes that the advantages and corresponding harms at stake are
within the realm of constitutional concern. To confine the realm of concern to purely evidentiary
advantages seems unfaithful to the sixth amendment policy against imbalanced adversarial contests.
161. Without some showing to the contrary, I would consider the positive governmental gains
vague, speculative, and presumptively negligible.
162. It should be noted that a "worse evidentiary position" for the state in the case in which the
evidence is suppressed is not the only cost of a deterrent suppression policy. If we succeed in deter-
ring out-of-court elicitations, we also risk damage to the government interest in legitimate, separate
investigations of uncharged crimes. See supra note 120 and accompanying text. Granted, the deter-
rent damage would be no more substantial than that which ordinarily flows from the suppression of
Massiah-violative evidence that does not come within an exception to exclusionary principles. If the
threats to adversary system values are sufficient to justify a deterrent policy, the government's inter-
ests must give way. Still, if there is no right to exclusion because evidence would have been inevita-
bly discovered, before we pursue a deterrent policy that will damage not only the present prosecution
but also our interests in investigating uncharged crimes, we should be confident that the objects of
our protective efforts-the threats to legitimate adversary system interests-justify the costs to be
sustained.
163. I have already predicted that the Supreme Court will apply its deterrent analysis of the
sixth amendment inevitable discovery doctrine to the fourth amendment and Miranda realms, See
supra note 148. The preceding textual discussion of deterrent possibilities suggests that the Court's
analysis in Nix not based on a full and fair assessment of the potential state benefits in inevitable
discovery (and also independent source) situations. To the extent that the government saves time,
money, or effort, or secures other types of investigatory advantage from its unconstitutional conduct,
there are profits, albeit nonevidentiary profits, from the illegality. These profits could provide sub-
stantial incentive for future illegalities. They might have to be removed to ensure adequate deter-
rence. In Nix the Court seemed blind to other than evidentiary profits in its evaluation of whether
the government position was the same, better, or worse.
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C. Evidence Derived From Massiah Violations and the Attenuation Exception
The origin of the independent source doctrine is also the origin of the gen-
eral principle that evidence derived from the immediate products of official mis-
conduct is subject to exclusion.164 Not long after the Court recognized a general
rule of presumptive inadmissibility 165 for "derivative" evidence, 166 it announced
an "attenuation exception" to that rule.' 67 If the chain of causation between the
illegal conduct and derivative evidence is sufficiently weak or "attenuated," that
evidence is not excludable as tainted "fruit of the poisonous tree."
168
Attenuation has been firmly rooted in contemporary deterrent reasoning. 169
The weaker the connection between the impropriety and the acquisition of evi-
dence, the lesser the incentive it is thought to provide for future illegalities. The
lesser the incentive it provides, the lower is the deterrent value of suppression.17 0
164. See Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920) ("The essence of a
provision forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely evidence so
acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall not be used at all."); see also Segura v.
United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984) (reiterating long accepted principle that "the exclusionary
rule reaches not only primary evidence . . . but also evidence later discovered and found to be
derivative of an illegality," that is, it "'extends as well to the indirect as the direct products' of
unconstitutional conduct" (quoting Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 484 (1963))).
165. By "presumptive inadmissibility" I mean that the evidence will be suppressed unless the
government establishes that it fits within an accepted exception to the general rule. See Segura v.
United States, 468 U.S. 796, 804 (1984) (exclusionary rule reaches not only "primary evidence ob-
tained as a direct result of an illegal search or seizure .... but also evidence later discovered and
found to be derivative of an illegality" unless attenuation or independent source established).
166. "Derivative" evidence refers to evidence that the state acquires by pursuing leads revealed
by its misconduct. It is "derived" from, and is in fact causally connected to, the original impropri-
ety. Derivative evidence is distinguishable from the "immediate" or "direct" products of the mis-
conduct, that is, the item or items turned up at the time of the misconduct.
167. Attenuation doctrine originated in the fourth amendment area. It is the oldest, most se-
curely established of the true "exceptions" to the fourth amendment exclusionary rule. Recent de-
velopments in Miranda law make the role of attenuation doctrine there uncertain. The Court has
hinted that evidence derived from Miranda violations may not be presumptively excludable. See
Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306-07 (1985) (exclusion of fruits of Miranda violations should be
approached more cautiously than exclusion of fruits of fourth amendment transgressions; Miranda
presumption of compulsion applicable to confession "does not require that the statements and their
fruits be discarded as inherently tainted"); see also State v. Wethered, 110 Wash.2d 466, 474, 755
P.2d 797, 801 (1988) (reading Elstad majority dictum as "strongly suggest[ing] that a Miranda viola-
tion without actual coercion will not taint evidence derived from a confession, no matter what form
such evidence takes"). As noted earlier, without a rule declaring derivative evidence inadmissible,
there is no need for the attenuation "exception," or any other exception.
168. According to the Court's exclusionary rule terminology, "fruits" are those products that
must be excluded. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 487-88 (1963) (not "all evidence is
'fruit of the poisonous tree' simply because it would not have come to light but for the illegal actions
of the police").
169. See United States v. Ceccolini, 435 U.S. 268, 275-79 (1978) (resolving question of attenua-
tion exception application to illegally derived "live-witness testimony" by balancing amount of in-
centive such testimony provides for future illegal searches against the high cost of "perpetually
disabl[ing] a witness from testifying about relevant and material facts"); Brown v. Illinois, 422 U.S.
590, 602-04 (1975) (decision whether derivative evidence is purged of taint of illegal arrest requires
consideration of the deterrent policies that underlie fourth amendment exclusion and an evaluation
of all relevant circumstances "in light of the policy served by the exclusionary rule").
170. See Brown, 422 U.S. at 609 (Powell, J., concurring in part) ("The notion of the 'dissipation
of the taint' attempts to mark the point at which the detrimental consequences of illegal police action
become so attenuated that the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule no longer justifies its cost.");
see also Ceccolini, 435 U.S. at 280 (in light of dissipated connection between illegality and testimony,
its suppression "could not have the slightest deterrent effect on the behavior of an officer").
1989]
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At the point where the deterrent value is too low to outweigh the costs of exclu-
sion, 17 ' cost-benefit balancing yields an exception to the rule barring derivative
products-the attenuation exception.
The Massiah right to exclusion should encompass derivative products,' 72
and should not be qualified by an attenuation exception.173 Equalizing counsel
should stand as a safeguard against both the direct and indirect evidentiary ad-
vantages of a failure to respect the Massiah entitlement. When either immediate
or derivative products of a denial of counsel are used to the defendant's disad-
vantage at trial, damage is done to his constitutional interest in not being
harmed by adversarial imbalance. Because of their destructive effect upon the
substantive benefits of adversarial fair play, derivative fruits should fall presump-
tively within the exclusionary right applicable to Massiah-violative disclosures.
As long as there is an actual causal connection between a pretrial depriva-
tion and the evidence to be introduced, the strength of that connection should
not matter. Attenuation doctrine presumes a situation wherein the disputed evi-
dence is the "but for" product of the state's transgression. t74 It recognizes,
however, that deterrent gains depend on the incentive value of the evidence to be
excluded, and the incentive value hinges in part on the strength of the causal
connection. That logic is simply inapplicable to right-based Massiah exclusion.
If actual, "but for" causation exists, 17 5 admission of the derivative evidence will
inflict the type of injury against which the sixth amendment protects.' 7 6 Be-
cause that injury is attributable to a deprivation of the assistance that the sixth
amendment promises, the evidence should be excluded as a matter of right. 177
171. The point at which the deterrent value is too low to justify the costs of exclusion has not
been defined with any specificity. In determining whether it is reached in a given case, all factors
bearing on the connection of the contested evidence to the original illegality should be considered,
particularly the time between the misconduct and discovery of the evidence, whether any significant
events have intervened, and the nature and character of the misconduct. See Brown, 422 U.S. at 603-
04.
172. See United States v. Massey, 437 F. Supp 843, 862 (M.D. Fla. 1977) ("the tainted fruit of
the poisonous tree doctrine should, and does, apply: all indirect evidence, testimonial and tangible,
acquired from.., admissions [secured in violation of Masslah] must be excluded as tainted fruit of
the disregard" of the sixth amendment).
173. But see Hamilton v. Nix, 781 F.2d 619, 624-26 (8th Cir. 1985), rev'd en banc, 809 F.2d 463
(1987) (applying attenuation analysis in case involving violation of due process and of Massiah doc-
trine); Massey, 437 F. Supp. at 862 (presumption favors exclusion of derivative products of sixth
amendment violation unless government shows indirect evidence qualifies for independent source or
attenuation exception).
174. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 488 (1963) (observing that attenuation or
purging of taint doctrine is applicable to evidence that "would not have come to light but for the
illegal actions of the police"). If evidence is not causally connected to the impropriety in a "but for"
sense, it has an independent source and, therefore, is not subject to the rule of presumptive inadmis-
sibility applicable only to derivative products. See United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 471 (1980)
(cases in which attenuation analysis is applicable must "begin with the premise that the challenged
evidence is in some sense the product of illegal governmental activity").
175. Unless, of course, the evidence would have been inevitably discovered. See supra notes 142-
56 and accompanying text.
176. If the evidentiary harm is truly negligible it may not be constitutionally cognizable. In that
situation, however, the admission of the evidence would not matter to the government or the defend-
ant. If the government seeks and cares about the admission of the evidence, the harm it causes will
not be negligible and, therefore, it should be suppressed.
177. Cf. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460-62 (1972) (testimony compelled under a
grant of immunity and evidence derived from that testimony must be excluded under the privilege
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D. A "Good Faith" or "Legitimate Reason" Exception to Sixth Amendment
Exclusion
Recently the Supreme Court endorsed a limited type of "good faith" excep-
tion to the fourth amendment exclusionary rule. 178 In United States v. Leon 179
and Massachusetts v. Sheppard 180 the Court held that if officers search in reason-
able reliance 181 on an invalid warrant' 82 the evidence secured as a result is ex-
cepted from exclusion. The Court based the newly formulated exception on
deterrent, cost-benefit grounds. The Leon-Sheppard exception's main premise is
that it is pointless and irrational to seek to discourage "reasonable" law enforce-
ment conduct. There is nothing to deter. Clearly, nonexistent deterrent benefits
cannot outweigh the ever-present costs of suppressing probative evidence. 183
In Maine v. Moulton 184 the Court rejected the government's claim that the
against self-incrimination and the federal immunity statute; same rule applicable to coerced confes-
sions under due process doctrine); Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n of New York Harbor, 378 U.S.
52, 79 & n.18 (1964) ("constitutional rule" is that a "witness may not be compelled to give testimony
which may be incriminating ... unless the compelled testimony and its fruits cannot be used in any
manner ... in connection with a criminal prosecution against him"; evidence is only admissible if
"independent, legitimate source" is proven) (emphasis added)).
An attenuation exception is fundamentally incompatible with the sixth amendment Massiah
right to exclusion, and with any other exclusionary right. Justice Brennan does not seem to believe
that the recognition of a right to exclusion necessitates the rejection of attenuation doctrine and the
suppression of all derivative evidence. Though he believes that fourth amendment exclusion is a
matter of right, see United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 933-34 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting);
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 509 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting), he authored a landmark fourth
amendment attenuation opinion. See Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). It is possible
that Justice Brennan would find the fourth and sixth amendment rights distinguishable for attenua-
tion purposes.
178. The character of the constitutional violation-the good or bad faith of the government-is
one relevant factor in attenuation analysis. See Brown, 422 U.S. 590, 604 (1975). In the Leon-
Sheppard exception it is not just a factor, but rather the critical factor. In addition, whereas the
attenuation exception is not applicable to primary products of misconduct, see Brown, 422 U.S. at
612 (Powell, J., concurring) (suggesting that accepted exclusionary rule doctrine would require the
suppression of confessions secured in the immediate context of an illegal arrest, that is, that they
could not be admitted under the attenuation doctrine), the Leon-Sheppard exception will render
primary products admissible. See United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 929 (1984) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (observing that the reasonable reliance on a warrant exception represents the first oppor-
tunity for the government to make use of the direct products of a fourth amendment violation in its
case-in-chief).
179. 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
180. 468 U.S. 981 (1984).
181. Leon-Sheppard is not a true "good faith" exception because it does not hinge on the subjec-
tive state of mind of the officers involved in the illegal search or seizure. In fact, the Court rejected
inquiry into the individual officer's mindset. See Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 n.23. The only question is
whether the officer's reliance on the warrant in the case was "objectively reasonable," that is,
"whether a reasonably well-trained officer would have known that the search was illegal despite the
magistrate's authorization." Id. at 922 & n.23.
182. The holding of Leon-Sheppard requires reasonable reliance on a warrant. Therefore, by its
literal terms the exception is confined to situations in which searches have been based on invalid
warrants.
183. Although the Leon-Sheppard exception is presently limited to warrant contexts and the
fourth amendment sphere, the core of its reasoning applies to warrantless situations and its deter-
rent-based, cost-benefit analysis could easily be extended to the Miranda arena. See Stone v. Powell,
428 U.S. 465, 538 (1976) (White, J., dissenting) (suggesting that no deterrence is possible, and there-
fore that an exception to exclusion ought to be applicable, whenever an officer violates the fourth
amendment in good faith and upon reasonable grounds).
184. 474 U.S. 159 (1985).
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Massiah right is inapplicable to good faith investigations of crimes that are sepa-
rate and independent from the offense with which the accused has already been
charged. In essence, the contention was that the entitlement to counsel that
normally operates when an accused is subjected to governmental elicitation is
inoperative if the elicitation of disclosures regarding the charged offense is part
of a good faith, legitimate investigation of an uncharged crime.185 The Moulton
majority concluded that the sixth amendment Massiah right barred the use of
uncounseled, knowingly elicited disclosures to prove a charged offense "notwith-
standing the fact that the police were also investigating other [uncharged]
crimes." 186 Chief Justice Burger demonstrated that the issue before the Court
could be recharacterized and analyzed as one involving the proper scope of sixth
amendment exclusion. He maintained in dissent that there was simply no good
reason to suppress evidence secured during good faith investigations.18 7 The
gist of his reasoning was that a "good reason" or "good motivation" exception
to Massiah exclusion is justifiable.
Leon, Sheppard, and Moulton suggest two distinct, but related, potential
exceptions to sixth amendment exclusion: one based on a "good faith, reason-
able" official belief that the accused was not entitled to Massiah counsel and
another grounded in a "legitimate reason" for failing to afford a defendant the
normal Massiah entitlement. 188 To the extent that it has any constitutional
merit, the first potential exception should be incorporated into the substantive
Massiah doctrine. The Massiah right to counsel's presence should apply not
only to intentional or knowing elicitation of disclosures, but also to "negligent
elicitation."' 189 If the government should know that its encounter with an ac-
cused could yield admissions, then the failure to accord counsel should be con-
sidered a transgression of the sixth amendment promise. The sixth amendment
entitlement should be inapplicable only in situations where the state should not
reasonably anticipate that an encounter could yield disclosures.190
185. See Moulton, 474 U.S. at 189 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("the Massiah rule is inapplicable to
situations where the government is gathering information related to a separate crime"); United
States v. Darwin, 757 F.2d 1193, 1200 (11th Cir. 1985) (pre-Moulton case rejecting the approach
taken ultimately by Moulton Court "because we conclude that the right to the presence of counsel
simply does not extend to a situation in which the defendant is engaged in the commission of a
separate offense").
186. Moulton, 474 U.S. at 180.
187. See id. at 190-92 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). The Chief Justice had first asserted that the
sixth amendment right recognized in Massiah should not have any application to legitimate, good
faith separate offense investigations. See id. at 181, 184-90 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (Massiah coun-
sel requirement "is inapplicable" to separate offense investigations if the officers do not act in bad
faith or initiate separate investigation as pretext to avoid Massiah requirement).
188. Like the Leon-Sheppard fourth amendment exception, the first potential exception would
rest on an assertion and evidence that an officer reasonably believed a defendant was not entitled to
counsel in a given situation. The second, Moulton-like exception would be premised on the claim
that a well-motivated deprivation of counsel, that is, a denial that serves some "higher" good, should
not result in exclusion.
189. The current doctrine should be modified by including within the category of Massiah-rcgu-
lated conduct not only negligent elicitation, but also intentional, knowing, or negligent listening. See
Tomkovicz, supra note 8, at 77-83.
190. Accidental acquisitions-encounters in which a defendant unforeseeably reveals informa-
tion-should not trigger counsel protection, but "negligent elicitation or listening" should. See
Tomkovicz, supra note 8, at 83 n.318. Under current doctrine the Massiah right to counsel is opera-
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A reformulated Massiah doctrine that reflected this position would contain
a "good faith exception" of sorts. There would be no right to exclusion in the
limited, and probably rare, situation where an uncounseled defendant has made
statements that were not reasonably foreseeable. Such statements would not be
admissible, however, because of an "exception" to the rule of exclusion that
would ordinarily apply to official conduct of the sort involved. Instead, they
would be admissible because the official conduct involved does not endanger the
right to counsel. 19 1 Under a properly modified Massiah doctrine, there is no
reason to recognize a "good faith" or "reasonable belief" exception to the sixth
amendment exclusionary right. 192
The second potential exception, the "legitimate reason" or "good motive"
exception, has no legitimate place anywhere in sixth amendment doctrine. In
essence, the "legitimate reason" exception holds it permissible to suspend a de-
fendant's constitutional counsel entitlement in order to promote allegedly supe-
rior state interests.' 93 Such suspension is incompatible with the sixth
amendment grant of an unqualified right to assistance. The right to adversarial
equalization is not like the qualified interests in privacy, property, and liberty
protected by the fourth amendment. It is an absolute part of every defendant's
fair play entitlement that cannot be outweighed by or denied because of compel-
ling state needs or admirable state motives.' 94 The "legitimate reason" argu-
tive only if the government acts deliberately or knowingly, and only if the government engages in
active elicitation of disclosures. The reformulation suggested here encompasses both negligence and
listening. See Tomkovicz, supra note 8, at 77-83.
The reference to the "government" in the proposed standard includes not only regular, formal
state agents, but any informant acting as a state agent. Previously, I have criticized what I perceive
to be an effort by the Court, in United States v. Henry, 447 U.S. 264 (1980), to provide some insula-
tion for the government from responsibility for the acts of its "irregular" agents. See Tomkovicz,
supra note 8, at 75-77.
191. As noted before, the right to exclusion that is part of the sixth amendment entitlement
presumes a pretrial deprivation of counsel's assistance. Without the denial of a pretrial entitlement,
there is no constitutionally cognizable harm when uncounseled disclosures are used to a defendant's
disadvantage at trial. Because the "accidental acquisition" of statements triggers no pretrial entitle-
ment to counsel, trial use of those statements does not violate the Constitution.
192. The sixth amendment does not provide that a defendant shall have the right to assistance of
counsel except when the government reasonably believes that he or she is not entitled. Cf. United
States v. Londono, 659 F. Supp. 758, 771 (E.D.N.Y. 1987) (despite fact that officers had no "im-
proper motive" or "bad faith" and "simply overlooked the risk that.., sixth amendment violations
might occur" the fruits of their elicitations must be suppressed).
193. See United States v. Darwin, 757 F.2d 1193, 1199 (lth Cir. 1985) (recognizing that "the
tension between the two views" regarding the propriety of allowing the government to prove charged
offenses with disclosures elicited during the investigation of separate offenses "can best be under-
stood as a value choice between ... the social utility in giving law enforcement officers relatively
wide latitude to investigate ... and.., the individual's interest in a broadly construed Sixth Amend-
ment right to counsel").
194. In Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 373-74 (1979), the Supreme Court held that the sixth
amendment right to trial counsel does not extend to alleged misdemeanants if no actual imprison-
ment is to be imposed upon conviction. In part, the Court justified its limitation of the sixth amend-
ment by pointing to the costs of appointed counsel for all defendants. See id. at 373 (extending the
sixth amendment right to all criminal cases, whether involving possible imprisonment or not, would
"impose unpredictable, but necessarily substantial, costs on" the states). As the textual discussion
implies, I disagree with the Court's conclusion in Scott that an unqualified constitutional right can be
limited because of its costs. Cf. Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 379 (1986) (Although costs
can be balanced against utility gains in fourth amendment exclusionary rule situations, "the Consti-
tution constrains our ability to allocate as we see fit the costs of ineffective assistance. The Sixth
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ment conceals an insidious form of ends-means reasoning that, if accepted,
would pose serious threats to constitutional liberties.1 9 5 To accomodate law en-
forcement interest it would improperly qualify the sixth amendment entitlement
to exclusion.' 96
Amendment mandates that the State bear the risk of constitutionally deficient assistance of
counsel.").
195. See Tomkovicz, supra note 8, at 88 (observing that the ends-means reasoning involved is
particularly objectionable because the means sought to be justified (denial of Massiah's protection at
the trial of a charged offense) are not even necessary for attainment of the ends sought (investigation
and proof of an uncharged offense)). The claim that superior governmental interests can outweigh
the pretrial right to counsel should be as objectionable as the claim that such interests can counter-
balance a defendant's protection against coercion of a confession. While a deprivation of counsel
may not be as dramatic a constitutional wrong as the coercion of admissions, both are serious af-
fronts to our constitutional pledge of fair play. At trial, we allow neither coercion nor a denial of
counsel, no matter how compelling the putative government interest. Our response should be identi-
cal when the prosecution posits superior government interests as bases for trial use of the products of
pretrial coercion or a pretrial denial of counsel. Cf. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 524 (1976)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (interest in ascertaining truth cannot justify restriction at trial of constitu-
tional rights that impede pursuit of that interest; therefore, it should not count against vindication of
those rights in habeas corpus proceedings).
Critics challenge the Moulton majority's holding. They contend that the conclusion that evi-
dence gathered during a separate investigation must be excluded from the trial of the charged offense
is theoretically and logically erroneous because the government's separate offense investigation is
undeniably legitimate and proper conduct. See Maine v. Moulton, 474 U.S. 159, 185-86 (1985)
(Burger, C.J., dissenting) (referring to the Court's decision to exclude evidence from the trial of the
charged offense as an "anomaly," and a "judicial aberration" that confers "a windfall benefit" on
defendants in situations where the police have engaged in "no impermissible conduct," but rather
"the kind of careful and diligent efforts" that "[c]ourts ought to applaud"); Note, Maine v. Moulton:
Striking the Balance Between the Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel and Society's Interest in Critni-
nalInvestigation of the Indicted Defendant, 35 DEPAUL L. REV. 881, 904 (1986) (suggesting that the
Court "properly ignored [the] theoretical problem" and chose not to "maintain theoretical purity" in
reaching the "anomalous" conclusion that evidence secured by permissible law enforcement conduct
must be excluded from the trial of the charged offense). Their criticism is ill-founded and rooted in
an invalid deterrent view of sixth amendment exclusion, see id. at 904, and in the erroneous belief
that sixth amendment wrongs are fully accomplished by the pretrial elicitation of disclosures without
counsel. See Moulton, 474 U.S. at 191 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ("the 'wrong' that the Court con-
demns was 'fully accomplished' by the elicitation of comments from the defendant and 'the exclu-
sionary rule is neither intended to nor able to cure the invasion of the defendant's rights which he
has already suffered'" (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984))).
The Moulton holding is wholly consistent with the right-based conception of sixth amendment
exclusion. One may grant that the pretrial conduct in separate investigation situations is not wrong-
ful, as the Moulton majority did, see Moulton, 474 U.S. at 179-80 & n.16, and still find that the
admission of a defendant's disclosures at the trial of the charged offense violates the sixth
amendment.
196. This may be the major, though not clearly articulated, premise underlying the Moulton
Court's unequivocal rejection of the "separate investigation" exception. The majority did observe
that the proposed exception would "risk[] the evisceration of the Sixth Amendment right recognized
in Massiah." Moulton, 474 U.S. at 180. It is important to note that the sixth amendment's terms
accommodate law enforcement interests in investigation by restricting the domain of counsel to
"criminal prosecutions." That limitation has led the Court to reject the possibility of any sixth
amendment right to counsel protection during the investigatory stage, that is, prior to the formal
initiation of proceedings. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 429 (1986).
My conclusion bears some similarity to Justice Brennan's conclusion in Leon. Because he be-
lieves fourth amendment exclusion to be a right, Justice Brennan found it constitutionally intolerable
to create a "good faith" exception based in part on the law enforcement costs of exclusion. See
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 941 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (exclusion is a part of the
fourth amendment right, a right that "directly contemplates that some reliable and incriminating
evidence will be lost to the government").
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E. Impeachment Use of Massiah- Violative Disclosures
The prosecution may use the primary products of both fourth amendment
and Miranda violations to impeach a testifying defendant. 197 According to the
Court, exclusion of the evidence from the government's case-in-chief adequately
deters future violations. 198 Moreover, the costs of barring reliable and probative
impeachment evidence199 and allowing a defendant to commit perjury with im-
punity20° outweigh the incremental deterrence gained by prohibiting impeach-
ment use.
The prosecution may not, however, use the products of official coercion to
impeach a defendant. The due process clause bars all use of involuntary confes-
sions. 201 The logic beneath this strict prohibition is evident from the nature and
purposes of due process exclusion and the reasoning that permits impeachment
use in Miranda contexts. The due process clause guarantees fundamental fair-
ness.202 Trial use of coerced evidence is foreign to the accusatorial foundations
of our system,20 3 and, therefore, antithetical to the command of "due" pro-
cess.2°4 Whether coerced admissions add substance to the case-in-chief or un-
dermine the defense by impeaching a contradictory defendant, their appearance
at a criminal trial threatens both substantive and procedural fairness.205
In addition, the out-of-court use of coercive tactics against an individual is
itself a deprivation of liberty that contravenes substantive due process. Such
practices threaten the well-being, integrity, and dignity of the individual in ways
197. See United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620 (1980) (allowing impeachment with products of
search that violated the fourth amendment); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975) (allowing use of
Miranda-violative statements to impeach); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971) (same).
198. See Havens, 446 U.S. at 626 ("deterren[ce] function of the rules excluding unconstitution-
ally obtained evidence is sufficiently served by denying its use to the government on its direct case");
Harris, 401 U.S. at 225 ("sufficient deterrence flows when the evidence in question is made unavaila-
ble to the prosecution in its case in chief").
199. See Havens, 446 U.S. at 626 ("forbidding the Government to impeach ... by using contrary
and reliable evidence in its possession fails to take account of... the importance of arriving at the
truth in criminal trials"); Harris, 401 U.S. at 225 ("The impeachment process here undoubtedly
provided valuable aid... and the benefits of this process should not be lost, in our view, because of
the speculative possibility that impermissible police conduct will be encouraged thereby.").
200. See Havens, 446 U.S. at 626 (rejecting the view that fourth amendment exclusion can be
invoked to enable defendants to commit perjury without risk of confrontation); Harris, 401 U.S. at
226 ("The shield provided by Miranda cannot be perverted into a license to use perjury by way of a
defense, free from the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances.").
201. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 398 (1978). Similarly, the privilege against compulsory
self-incrimination bars all use of the products of actual compulsion. See New Jersey v. Portash, 440
U.S. 450, 459 (1979).
202. See supra note 64 and accompanying text.
203. Ours is an accusatorial system that forces the government to prove charges without requir-
ing the accused to assist, not an inquisitorial system that would seek conviction by demanding a
defendant's self-accusatory assistance. See Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 434 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
204. See Mincey, 437 U.S. at 402 ("Due process of law requires that statements obtained [by
coercion] cannot be used in any way against a defendant at his trial.").
205. Substantive fairness is threatened by the potential untrustworthiness of coerced admissions
and the consequent threat of convicting the innocent. Procedural fairness is jeopardized by the
inquisitorial character of using coerced admissions to secure convictions, a practice in conflict with
our devotion to accusatorial premises. See supra text accompanying notes 65-67.
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society abhors. 206 Because of the serious harms caused by coercion both inside
and outside the courtroom and because the costs of exclusion are not as weighty
as in fourth amendment and Miranda situations, 20 7 the deterrent balance favors
broader suppression. To eliminate all incentives for coercion, all uses of coerced
confessions, including impeachment use, should be, and are, proscribed.
The Court has not yet addressed the question of impeachment use of Mas-
siah-violative products. 20 8 The impeachment precedents in other areas and the
nature of Massiah exclusion, however, point toward the appropriate answer to
that question.20 9 Like due process exclusion, Massiah exclusion is an inherent
part of fair play. It ensures that the substantive damage threatened by adver-
sarial inequality does not ripen at trial.210 Impeachment use of a defendant's
disclosures can damage a defense just as seriously as substantive use.2 11 And,
like substantive use, impeachment use of Massiah-violative disclosures inflicts
the type of injury that counsel combats. When impeachment evidence is the
product of a pretrial deprivation of counsel, use of that evidence to undermine
the defense at trial damages the defendant's sixth amendment interest in adver-
sarial fair play.2 12 Therefore, the sixth amendment right to exclusion should bar
206. See supra notes 65 & 67.
207. Because of the possible unreliability and inaccuracy of coerced admissions, the evidence
suppressed is not necessarily probative, Consequently, the costs of suppression are lower. Even in
those cases where coerced admissions are accurate, the severity of the harm threatened by subjecting
an individual to official coercion outweighs the costs and tips the deterrent balance in favor of
suppression.
208. Recently, however, the court granted certiorari in a case in which a Michigan court barred
impeachment use of statements taken in violation of the Massiah doctrine. See Michigan v. Harvey,
109 S. Ct. 1117 (1989). Presumably, the Court's decision in Harvey will resolve the lower court's
split on the issue. See Lucas v. New York, 474 U.S. 911, 912 (1985) (White, J., dissenting from
denial of cert.) (observing that lower courts have split on propriety of impeachment use in sixth
amendment contexts); compare United States v. Brown, 699 F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1983) (rejecting con-
stitutionality of impeachment use) with United States v. McManaman, 606 F.2d 919, 925 (10th Cir.
1979) (allowing impeachment of defendant's "'sweeping' denial of drug dealing" with statements
secured in violation of Massiah right). Most lower courts that have addressed the issue have found
impeachment use permissible. See Comment, supra note 74, at 377.
209. In United States v. Brown, 699 F.2d 585, 589-90 (2d Cir. 1983), the Second Circuit resolved
the issue by reference to the reasoning of the Supreme Court's impeachment precedents in the Mi-
randa and privilege against self-incrimination areas. The court found the deterrent reasoning in the
Miranda context irrelevant. It concluded that cost-benefit balancing is as " 'impermissible'" when
the sixth amendment right is at stake as it is when actual compulsion in violation of the fifth amend-
ment privilege is at stake. Consequently, the court condemned impeachment use of Massiah-viola-
tive statements. But cf People v. Jacobs, 181 Cal. App. 3d 916, 921, 226 Cal. Rptr. 786, 788-89
(1986) (suggesting that because impeachment use will combat pejury, and because there is no police
misconduct to be deterred in Massiah contexts, there is even less reason to bar impeachment use than
in other contexts).
210. See supra notes 98-101 and accompanying text.
211. See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 485 (1976) (observing that the exclusionary rule of the
fourth amendment poses no bar to impeachment use, "even though [the evidence's] introduction is
certain to result in conviction in some cases"); United States v. Havens, 446 U.S. 620, 632 n.2 (1980)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that by allowing the government to use illegally obtained evidence
to impeach a defendant, "almost anytime an accused takes the stand, the prosecution will have an
opportunity to enhance its case in chief" in ways that go beyond the mere undermining of the
defendant's credibility); Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 231 (1971) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(" 'An incriminating statement is as incriminating when used to impeach credibility as it is when
used as direct proof of guilt.'" (quoting People v. Kulis, 18 N.Y.2d 318, 324, 221 N.E.2d 541, 543,
274 N.Y.S.2d 873, 876 (1966) (Keating, J., dissenting))).
212. See United States v. Brown, 699 F.2d at 590 ("Balancing th[e sixth amendment's] constitu-
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all uses of uncounseled disclosures obtained in violation of Massiah.2 13
F. The Applicability of the Doctrine of Stone v. Powell to Sixth Amendment
Claims
According to the doctrine of Stone v. Powel12 14 the remedy of fourth
amendment exclusion is generally unavailable in federal habeas corpus proceed-
ings. Specifically, "where the State has provided an opportunity for full and fair
litigation of a Fourth Amendment claim, a state prisoner may not be granted
federal habeas corpus relief on the ground that evidence obtained in an unconsti-
tutional search or seizure was introduced at his trial."'2 15 Like all modem fourth
amendment exclusionary rule limitations, the doctrine's roots are in deterrent
theory. According to the Stone majority's reasoning, the "substantial societal
costs" of exclusion, retrial, and possible lost convictions clearly outweigh the
"minimal" additional deterrent force gained by suppression in a collateral pro-
ceeding, at a time far removed from the constitutional violation. 21 6 The threat
of suppression in a full and fair state proceeding is considered sufficient to edu-
cate the police and discourage future violations of fourth amendment
commands. 2 17
While the Court has not decided whether Stone is applicable to sixth
amendment claims,218 some Justices have speculated about the doctrine's rele-
tional protection is... 'impermissible.'" Therefore, disclosures obtained in violation of the Massiah
entitlement may not be used to impeach regardless of the government interests that are served.).
213. See Wasserstrom & Mertens, supra note 9, at 178 n.515 ("IfMassiah is meant to preserve
an evenhanded and judicially regulated method of postindictment evidence acquisition, so that the
government is not unfairly advantaged, then both direct and impeachment use of the evidence ought
to be barred under Massiah."); Comment, supra note 74, at 380 (maintaining that impeachment
exception to Massiah exclusion should be rejected).
214. 428 U.S. 465 (1976). Thorough evaluation and critique of the Stone doctrine is not an
objective of this Article. Rather, the sole end here is to determine whether that doctrine can logi-
cally and constitutionally be extended to sixth amendment Massiah claims.
215. Id. at 494.
216. See id. at 489, 493-95.
217. See id. at 492-93 (in hope that future violations will be deterred and to encourage incorpo-
ration of fourth amendment ideals into law enforcement value systems, the Court continues to ad-
here to the exclusionary rule at trial and on direct appeal of convictions). The Court has not held
the Stone doctrine applicable to Miranda claims, but recently has evinced a strong bias against ex-
pansive interpretation of the Miranda exclusionary rule. Moreover, the fourth amendment reason-
ing in Stone seems largely, if not wholly, applicable to Miranda exclusion. See Richardson v. Stone,
421 F. Supp. 577, 578-79 & n.2 (N.D. Cal. 1976) (Stone doctrine is applicable to Miranda claims, but
not to coerced confession claims). But see Jarrell v. Balkcom, 735 F.2d 1242, 1251 (1 1th Cir. 1984)
("most courts confronting the issue.., have not extended Stone to... Miranda claims"); White v.
Finkbeiner, 687 F.2d 885, 888-94 (7th Cir. 1982) (discussing application of Stone doctrine to alleged
Miranda violations at length and refusing to extend it).
218. See Nix, 467 U.S. at 450 n.7 (finding "it unnecessary to decide whether Stone v. Powell, 428
U.S. 465 (1976), should be extended to bar federal habeas corpus review of Williams' Sixth Amend-
ment claim, and ... express[ing] no view on that issue"). But see Stone, 428 U.S. at 517-18, 535
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (predicting that "the groundwork is being laid" for preclusion of collateral
relief for other constitutional violations and expressing fear that "ultimately ... state prisoners'
claims of violations of other constitutional rights" will be treated like the fourth amendment claims
in Stone).
Lower courts have rejected claims that Stone governs Massiah claims. See, e.g., DeAngelo v.
Wainwright, 781 F.2d 1516, 1518-19 (11th Cir.) (Stone should not be extended to sixth amendment
claim), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 953 (1986); United States ex rel. Sanders v. Rowe, 460 F. Supp. 1128,
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vance to Massiah violations. 2 19 They have suggested that sixth amendment dep-
rivations are divisible into two categories, and that Stone's reasoning might well
govern those violations that neither threaten the accuracy of guilt-innocence de-
terminations nor involve the employment of coercive tactics. 220 If so, exclusion
based on certain Massiah violations would not be available in collateral proceed-
ings unless the state had denied a full and fair hearing on the sixth amendment
claim. 221
The posited dichotomy of sixth amendment violations is false, and the sug-
gestion that sixth amendment exclusion is sometimes a mere deterrent safeguard
is misguided. When the government denies counsel and then exploits that denial
at trial by introducing disclosures from an unprotected accused, the accused
suffers a real, substantial loss of the benefits of adversarial fair play. Trials
fueled by the products of adversarial imbalance are constitutionally unfair
whether or not those products are potentially untruthful or involuntary.222 Ex-
1141-46 (N.D. Ill. 1978) (refusing to apply Stone doctrine to Massiah claim); see also White v.
Finkbeiner, 687 F.2d 885, 889 (7th Cir. 1982), vacated sub nom. Fairman v. White, 465 U.S. 1075
(1984) ("virtually uniformly lower courts either have refused to, or have stated in dicta that they
would not, extend Stone beyond Fourth Amendment claims") (footnote omitted); W. LAFAVE & J.
ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1033 (1985) ("Lower court rulings dealing with habeas claims
based on Miranda or Massiah generally have been unwilling to extend Stone to such claims.").
219. See Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387, 426-28 & nn.8-9 (1977) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) ; id.
at 413-14 (Powell, J., concurring).
220. See Williams, 430 U.S. at 426-27 & n.9 (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (suggesting that some
sixth amendment claims would justify exclusion in collateral proceedings for "deterrent" or "norma-
tive purposes," but that other sixth amendment-based claims for exclusion are indistinguishable
from fourth amendment claims because of their "irrelevancy" to "factual guilt or innocence" and the
"'minimal deterrent effect" that exclusion would have); id. at 414 (Powell, J., concurring) (distin-
guishing between sixth amendment claims that "arise in the context of challenges to the fairness of a
trial or to the integrity of the factfinding process" and those "that more closely parallel" fourth
amendment claims insofar as they involve the suppression of reliable and probative evidence, and
leaving open the possibility that Stone may be applicable to the latter).
Although these Justices speak of counsel violations that jeopardize "fairness" or implicate "nor-
mative" sixth amendment purposes, it is apparent that the Massiah violations they would exclude
from Stone's sphere are those in which law enforcement tactics have cast doubt on the reliability of
the defendant's disclosures or have coerced them from the accused. Cf. Kimmelman v. Morrison,
477 U.S. 365, 396 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment) (suggesting that defense counsel's
incompetent failure to raise a meritorious fourth amendment claim at trial cannot form the basis for
a successful ineffective assistance of counsel claim under the sixth amendment because the only effect
is "the admission of illegally seized but reliable evidence" and such evidence "does not lead to an
unjust or fundamentally unfair verdict" or affect "the fundamental fairness of the trial"). In other
words, the only type of Massiah violations for which they would certainly continue to guarantee
relief on habeas are those that also involve fifth amendment due process violations. The availability
of sixth amendment relief on habeas would be rendered superfluous by such a limitation.
221. The Justices have also suggested that if Stone was found applicable to sixth amendment
claims that putatively resemble fourth amendment claims, habeas relief would remain available for
many sixth amendment deprivations. See Williams, 430 U.S. at 427 n.9 (Burger, C.J., dissenting);
id. at 414 (Powell, J., concurring). The accuracy of that suggestion is more than questionable. Few
sixth amendment claims involve real threats to the reliability of evidence or coercive interrogation
methods. Therefore, for most sixth amendment claims habeas relief would be available only in the
undoubtedly rare instance in which a state failed to accord a full and fair hearing. All in all, little
sixth amendment-based exclusion would occur in federal collateral proceedings.
222. The contary view that underlies most attacks on the Massiah entitlement and upon Massiah
exclusion is that fairness in our criminal justice system demands no more than accurate factfinding
and an absence of official coercion. See supra note 220. That vision of adversary system fairness
suffocates sixth amendment values. See Tomkovicz, supra note 8, at 39-62.
[Vol. 67
1989] MASSIAH RIGHT TO EXCLUSION
elusion of the fruits of Massiah violations is always part and parcel of an ac-
cused's sixth amendment fair play entitlement.
Stone's deterrent-based analysis is irrelevant to the Massiah right to exclu-
sion.2 23  Since fourth amendment exclusion is a future-oriented device, the
223. It is difficult to predict whether the Court will hold that the Stone doctrine poses a bar to
"Massiah claims. The Stone majority proffered a variety of reasons for its holding, leaving the deci-
sion "open to widely divergent interpretation." See United States ex rel. Sanders v. Rowe, 460 F.
Supp. 1128, 1141-42 (N.D. Ill. 1978). "Some of th[ose reasons] are not logically limited to fourth
amendment violations." Id. at 1142. For example, the Court observed that habeas corpus relief
must remain available to protect "innocent" persons and to remedy "intolerable restraints and griev-
ous wrongs." It warned against the "serious intrusions" on important values that result from the use
of habeas corpus for purposes other than to assure "that no innocent person suffers unconstitutional
loss of liberty." Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 491 n.31. (1976); see also Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S.
545, 587 n. 10 (1979) (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment) (suggesting that a primary rationale of
Stone was that fourth amendment exclusionary rule claims have "nothing to do with the guilt or
innocence of the prisoner"). Massiah violations do not typically lead to the conviction of "in-
nocents." And it is doubtful that the Court would conclude that ordinary Massiah right depriva-
tions constitute "grievous wrongs" or lead to "intolerable restraints."
In addition, the Stone majority relied heavily on the fact that the petitioner sought the benefits
of a judicially created deterrent safeguard that is designed to deter future wrongs, not to vindicate a
present, personal right of the petitioner. The Court reasoned that any marginal deterrent gain was
outweighed by the clear and substantial costs of suppression at the collateral stage. See Stone, 428
U.S. at 491-94; see also Kimmelman v. Morrison, 477 U.S. 365, 375-76 (1986) (noting that the Stone
"Court found it critical that" the exclusionary rule is not a personal right, but is a judicially created
deterrent remedy); Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545, 560 (1979) (Stone majority "made it clear that it
was confining its ruling to cases involving the judicially created exclusionary rule, which had mini-
mal utility when applied in a habeas corpus proceeding"). The majority opinion in Nix v. Williams,
467 U.S. 431 (1984), suggests that exclusion in Massiah cases might be attributable to a similar
judicially created rule. While the Nix Court did entertain the possibility that Massiah exclusion is a
right, it placed considerably greater emphasis upon deterrent premises. See supra text accompanying
notes 85-89. If the Court concludes, as Nix intimates, that the only substantial reason for an "exclu-
sionary rule" in all, or some, Massiah cases is to discourage future deprivations of pretrial counsel,
the primary premise of Stone would be relevant to those Massiah cases.
Despite such indications that Stone's reasoning could well extend to typical Massiah claims,
there are several bases for hope that, if the occasion arises, the Court will find Stone inapplicable to
those claims. In the thirteen years since Stone the Court has not extended it to a single additional
context, but has twice rejected claims for extension of the doctrine. See Kimmelman v. Morrison,
477 U.S. 365 (1986) (Stone inapplicable to ineffective assistance of counsel claim based on failure to
raise fourth amendment violation at trial); Rose v. Mitchell, 443 U.S. 545 (1979) (Stone does not
govern fourteenth amendment equal protection claim of racial discrimination in selection of grand
jury foreman). The Court has described Stone as an opinion of "carefully limited.., reach." Id. at
560.
The Kimmelman decision is a particular cause for optimism. The petitioner therein claimed
that his counsel had been constitutionally ineffective in violation of his sixth amendment right. The
basis of the alleged ineffectiveness was the failure to assert a valid fourth amendment claim for
suppression of reliable and probative evidence. The Court concluded that Stone could not be ex-
tended to the petitioner's claim of deprivation of the fundamental right to counsel. Kimmelman, 477
U.S. at 382-83. The Court reasoned that a sixth amendment claim, even one based on incompetent
failure to assert the fourth amendment exclusionary rule, implicated different constititutional values
than a fourth amendment claim, values pertaining to the fairness of the trial. Id. at 375-78. Impor-
tantly, the Court refused to consider dispositive the fact that the petitioner's argument did not cast
doubt on the reliability of the guilt-innocence determination at trial. Id. at 379-80. According to the
Court, "[c]onstitutional rights of criminal defendants are granted to the innocent and the guilty
alike." Id. at 380. Vindication of the right to counsel could not be "conditioned upon actual inno-
cence." See id. at 380; see also id. at 393 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment) ("the right to
effective assistance of counsel ensures that defendants have a fair opportunity to contest the charges
against them" and that opportunity includes the raising of meritorious fourth amendment exclusion-
ary rule claims).
In addition, lower courts have rarely found Stone applicable outside the fourth amendment
realm. See supra note 218; see also United States ex rel. Sanders v. Rowe, 460 F. Supp. 1128, 1146
n.53 (N.D. Il1. 1978) (calling it "unlikely that [the doctrine] will ever be extended to the violation of
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Court could properly consider whether its remedial objectives were well served
by delayed suppression in a collateral proceeding. It could legitimately consider
the costs of pursuing those objectives at that late stage. In the sixth amendment
area, where exclusion is a constitutional right, such interest balancing is illegiti-
mate at any stage. In habeas corpus actions the federal courts are obligated to
ensure that unvindicated constitutional rights are vindicated.224 The accused is
entitled to more than just a full and fair state court hearing on his sixth amend-
ment claim, he is entitled to full and fair protection and enforcement of his right
to counsel. When the government introduces Massiah-violative evidence at trial,
it violates the right to counsel. Exclusion in a collateral proceeding is necessary
and proper to remedy the denial of the personal right to assistance.
The Court should confine Stone to areas where its analytical underpinnings
are relevant. In the Massiah domain, the doctrine would undermine our com-
mitment to sixth amendment values and erode the constitutional promise of
equalization.
V. CONCLUSION
Courts should resolve issues raised by the exclusion of evidence from crimi-
nal trials by reference to the rationales for such exclusion. They should derive
the rationales for each different constitutional context from the objectives and
character of the constitutional provision at stake. The nature of the sixth
amendment promise of defense counsel and the pretrial extension of that prom-
ise delineated by the Massiah doctrine point toward but one legitimate rationale
for suppression. Sixth amendment Massiah-based exclusion is a personal, con-
stitutional right, not a judicially created, deterrent safeguard.
Too often judges simply graft fourth amendment and Miranda exclusionary
rule limitations and qualifications onto the Massiah realm. That approach to
exclusionary questions is unacceptable. Instead, the right-based character of
sixth amendment suppression should prompt different analyses of several ac-
the sixth amendment right to counsel" defined by Massiah doctrine). They have found ample sup-
port in the Stone opinion for the conclusion that its holding is relevant to the fourth amendment
realm alone. See id. at 1144-46.
In sum, the extension of Stone v. Powell to Massiah claims is "a live possibility." W. LAFAVE
& J. ISRAEL, supra note 218, at 1032-33. The Stone opinion itself provides support for application of
its holding to the Massiah realm. On the other hand, the reasoning of subsequent decisions, al-
thougth not conclusive on the question of Stone's relevance to Massiah violations, see W. LAFAVE &
J. ISRAEL, supra note 218, at 1032, does provide support for a refusal to extend the doctrine. More-
over, those decisions indicate a reluctance to extend Stone beyond its fourth amendment origins.
224. See W. DUKER, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF HABEAS CORPUS 3-7 (1980) (the func-
tion of habeas corpus is to provide a forum to "vindicate substantive rights"); R. HURD, A TREA-
TISE ON THE THE RIGHT OF PERSONAL LIBERTY AND ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 129 (De
Capo Press reprint 1972) (2d ed. 1876) (the writ of habeas corpus is for the "vindication of the right
of personal liberty when illegally restrained"); see also Kuhlmann v. Wilson, 477 U.S, 436, 447
(1986) (observing that "the writ should be available to afford relief to those 'persons whom society
has grievously wronged' in light of modern concepts of justice" (quoting Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391,
440-41 (1963))); Kimmelman, 477 U.S. at 383 ("Where a State obtains a criminal conviction in a
trial in which the accused is deprived of the effective assistance of counsel, the 'State ... unconstitu-
tionally deprives the defendant of his liberty.'. .. The defendant is thus 'in custody in violation of
the Constitution,' 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a), and federal courts have habeas jurisdiction over his claim."
(quoting Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 US. 335, 343 (1980))).
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cepted exclusionary rule doctrines that have developed in deterrent milieus. To
ensure full enforcement of the right to counsel, sixth amendment reevaluation of
those doctrines is essential.
Such reevaluation suggests that a standing limitation, an independent
source doctrine, and an inevitable discovery exception make sense as sixth
amendment qualifications. On the other hand, the attenuation and "good faith"
exceptions, the impeachment qualification, and the doctrine of Stone v. Powell
prove to be illogical and dangerous to the sixth amendment right. They should
not temper Massiah suppression. Proper resolution of these and other exclusion-
ary issues in sixth amendment settings requires full awareness that the right to
counsel is not violated by out-of-court dealings with uncounseled defendants,
but by the use of the products of those dealings at trial. If that awareness serves
as a backdrop, the substance of the right to counsel will survive the serious
threats posed by facile and uncritical application of "exclusionary rule"
doctrines.

